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Author’s Note
I wrote this essay in the spring and summer of 2014, when I submitted it as
my thesis for the BPhil in Philosophy at Oxford. I intended to revise parts of it
for publication, but life gets in the way. I am therefore making public the origi-
nal version—typos and all!—hoping it may be useful to philosophers and others
interested in homotopy type theory, category theory, dependent type theory, and
mathematical structuralism.
If I were to revisit this material, I would no doubt do things differently. Let me
briefly sketch how my views had changed, when last I thought about these issues.
The original idea of the thesis was to make the best sense I could of the idea
that homotopy type theory provides an ‘object structuralist’ foundation for mathe-
matics: a theory on which there is a domain of mathematical objects that only have
structural (i.e. isomorphism-invariant) properties. The key to this interpretation is
obviously the univalence axiom, which appears to assert that isomorphic (or, more
generally, equivalent) types are identical. Combine this with the thought that iden-
tical objects have all the same properties, in the form of the path-induction axiom.
It follows that all the properties of types are structural. At least, that is the rough
idea; the apparent miracle of homotopy type theory is that it gives a framework in
which this idea can flourish.
In contrast to ‘object structuralism’, the metaphysically more modest view of
‘property structuralism’ says that, whatever sorts of objects there may be, mathe-
matics is (generally speaking) only concerned with their structural properties. I
later realised that there is an alternative interpretation of the univalence axiom
along property-structuralist lines, as long as we are willing to be slightly less defer-
ential to notation. I defended this interpretation in a few talks in 2015. To indicate
the rough idea, we could linguistically do away with the identity relation between
types, and instead understand univalence as attributing the path-induction prop-
erty to the isomorphism relation. (My criticism of related ideas in section 7.2 of
chapter IV now strikes me as mistaken.) In classical terms, the upshot would still
be that ‘all the properties of types are structural’, but the trick is that, having set
aside the identity relation, we can understand the ‘all’ as a restricted quantifier,
ranging over structural properties only. This is the sort of quantifier restriction
that a property structuralist might recommend.
While I am still drawn to the romance of object-structuralism, it seems to
me that the property-structuralist interpretation is the more prudent bet, while
remaining broadly sympathetic to homotopy type theory, including univalence, as
a foundational project. Indeed, it still strikes me as a worthy goal to provide a
property-structuralist foundation for mathematics, and it is still remarkable that
homotopy type theory is in with a fighting chance. Were I to revise the essay, I
would wish to develop and emphasise these points more clearly.
TERUJI THOMAS
Oxford, 3 April 2021
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This thesis represents perhaps the first attempt at a sustained philo-
sophical interpretation of homotopy type theory (HOTT). Over the last
decade, HOTT has developed as a major new candidate for mathematical
foundations. Unusually for a foundational programme, it has some influ-
ential advocates within the mainstream mathematical community. The
precondition for this thesis is the recent publication of a textbook (Uni-
valent Foundations Program (2013), henceforth UFP), which provides a
canonical reference-point for a quickly-evolving field. The guiding light of
this thesis is the unavoidable impression that HOTT articulates a distinc-
tively structuralist vision of mathematics. For example, Awodey (2014)
writes that, according to HOTT,
mathematical objects simply are structures. Could there
be a stronger formulation of structuralism? (p. 11)
My basic goal is to explore and evaluate this claim.1 But HOTT has so
many novel features that I will have to grapple with its interpretation more
broadly.
A few words of motivation. If Awodey’s conclusion is correct, homo-
topy type theory may be the closest thing we have to a rigorous articula-
tion of ontological structuralism. The competition is not stiff. Even seeing
1Awodey himself does not really argue for it. The closest thing to an argument is that,
according to HOTT, ‘[T]wo mathematical objects are identical if and only if they have
the same structure. . . . In other words, mathematical objects simply are structures.’ Ac-
cepting the first sentence, the second doesn’t follow. To give a mathematical example,
two sets X and Y are identical if and only if they have the same singletons {X } and {Y };
it doesn’t follow that sets simply are singletons.
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how this articulation fails is likely to advance our understanding. Second,
nowhere near enough philosophical attention has been paid to the areas
of mathematics to which homotopy type theory is particularly adapted:
homotopy theory, higher category theory, and their kin. These are not
niche areas in twenty-first century mathematics, or even in twenty-first
century theoretical physics. But they provide distinctive challenges to the
philosophy of mathematics in general and to structuralism in particular.
Homotopy type theory claims to provide a newly perspicacious treatment
of these fields. That alone would make it worth our while.
In this introduction, I disentangle some of the features of HOTT that
are relevant to its foundational aspirations. This will help to clarify both
what HOTT is about, and the kind of questions that will interest me here.
Then I will briefly lay out some ideas about structuralism that will frame
my analysis. Then I will outline the contents of this thesis.
1. Homotopy Type Theory
The first observation is that HOTT has claims both as a foundation for
mathematics in general and as a foundation for homotopy theory in partic-
ular. Let me begin with the latter. On a first pass, one can think of the
objects of homotopy theory as sets with a certain kind of structure, much
as groups or manifolds are sets with structure. (On a second pass, these
objects are simply topological spaces, but the ‘structure-preserving maps’
between them are not simply the continuous functions.) On one reading,
the objects of HOTT — the eponymous types — just are those sets with struc-
ture, and HOTT is a theory about them.2 So, on that reading, HOTT is only
a ‘foundation’ for a proper part of standard mathematics, in roughly the
2It is important to realise that in this heuristic description I am using the word ‘theory’ in
a different sense from the usual model-theoretic one. HOTT comprises not only axioms
but also a whole deductive system.
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way that Euclid’s postulates sought to provide a foundation for geometry.
The basic reason to seek such a foundation is a sense — developed over
decades of mathematical practice — that the classical set-theoretic treat-
ment of homotopy theory, while perhaps formally adequate, fails to make
perspicuous the main concepts and results.
Adopting a new framework like HOTT leaves open a range of possible
interpretations. A conservative interpretation is that HOTT is merely a
‘fresh look’ at homotopy theory, which is ultimately to be interpreted in
familiar set-theoretic terms. In analogy, the adoption of ‘line’ as a primi-
tive in the development of Euclidean geometry does not preclude the view
that straight lines are sets of points. It is simply more useful, for certain
purposes, to start from the high-level conceptual framework employed by
the postulates.
A radical alternative is to think of HOTT as a ‘fresh start’. On this view,
HOTT is no more to be interpreted in some background set theory, like
ZFC, than set theory itself is to be interpreted in such a background. The
objects of HOTT can be represented and studied within ZFC, as the standard
development of homotopy theory indicates. But this only attests to the
representational power of set theory, not to the conceptual or ontological
priority of sets over homotopy types.
This radical alternative is encouraged by the observation that most of
ordinary mathematics (including traditional homotopy theory) can be de-
veloped inside HOTT, using what amount to the standard set-theoretic tech-
niques. This is because sets are among the objects of homotopy theory:
in terms of the standard development of the subject, every set has a de-
fault (‘discrete’) homotopy structure. In this sense, HOTT has potential as
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a foundation for mathematics in general. On the face of it, HOTT even
generalises standard mathematics, since only some types are sets.
As a set-theoretic foundation, however, HOTT has two distinctive fea-
tures. The first feature is that there is no membership relation between
sets. For this reason, the sets are not governed by Zermelo set theory
(ZST), but rather by a version of categorical set theory (CST).3 This lat-
ter set theory has played a prominent role in philosophical discussions of
‘category-theoretic structuralism.’ In particular, it has been alleged that
CST is a distinctively structuralist foundation, in contrast to ZST.
The second feature is the subtle treatment of identity. On the face of it,
HOTT claims that all sets of the same cardinality are identical, and in some-
what more generality that isomorphic mathematical systems are identical.
This is the fundamental Univalence axiom; it is what led Awodey to declare
that ‘mathematical objects simply are structures.’
This sketch suggests two distinct (although not wholly independent)
lines of inquiry for a philosophical interpretation and evaluation of HOTT.
First, what should one make of the apparent generalisation of set theory
to homotopy theory? Second, what should one make of the treatment
of conventional mathematics within the set-theoretic fragment of HOTT?
In this thesis I am going to focus primarily on the second question. In
particular, I will examine the prospects for a structuralist interpretation of
homotopy type theory.
To complete this introduction to the foundational claims of homotopy
type theory, I should mention two closely linked features of HOTT that are
3I use ‘Zermelo set theory’ to refer generically to Z , ZF C , and whatever else, although
I will usually assume there are no ur-elements. Similarly, the canonical version of cate-
gorical set theory is Lawvere’s ETCS(Lawvere, 1964). However, there are many possible
extensions and reformulations which I include under this banner.
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sometimes put forward as advantages of HOTT over conventional founda-
tions, but which I intend largely to set aside. These features are automation
and constructivity.
On the first point, HOTT lends itself to automated proof-checking and
(at least partly) automated proof-generation. This is not a trivial concern,
if one thinks that such automation will play a significant role in future
mathematical practice. It is also potentially a ‘foundational’ concern, to
the extent that ‘foundations’ ought to codify, ease, and shed light upon
such practice. Be that as it may, I am interested in more metaphysical ques-
tions. For example, how does the proposed foundation relate to the subject
matter of mathematics, if there is such a thing? I do not think that compu-
tation and automation are immediately relevant to such questions.
As for the second feature I mentioned, the formal system of HOTT is
a version of Martin-Löf’s intuitionistic type theory (Martin-Löf, 1984).
However, in so far as it matters, I will enforce classical logic. What this
means is a bit complicated, because there turn out to be several possible
views about what ‘logic’ is in HOTT. For the cognoscenti: I will henceforth
assume the axiom of choice for sets, which entails LEM for mere proposi-
tions as well as other useful results like propositional resizing (UFP, ch.
3). At a technical level, the adoption of classical logic will not interfere
with the other features of HOTT that interest me. At a philosophical level,
two basic points can be made. First, intuitionistic logic is typically un-
derstood as a logic of provability or constructibility, rather than as a logic
of truth. For that reason, LEM is a natural part of broadly realist philoso-
phies of mathematics. Realism is a natural default for this kind of inter-
pretive project: it allows me to ask what HOTT claims about the world.
The second point is that, regardless of whether one is a realist, it is worth
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asking what sort of framework HOTT provides for mainstream — hence
non-constructive — mathematics.
Two serious caveats must be added to this endorsement of classical
logic. They will be important later on. First, HOTT is, as the name sug-
gests, a kind of type theory, and the class of well-typed sentences is more
limited than one might expect. For example, there is no way to express
equality between elements of distinct sets. There is then no question of
whether such equalities satisfy the law of excluded middle. Second, as
already advertised, HOTT has a distinctive treatment of equality between
sets. On one reading, this means that the inference rules for identity are
broadly intuitionistic. I will reject this reading, but it is a major issue we
must face.
2. Property Versus Object Structuralism
The question that guides my approach to HOTT is whether and how
it articulates a structuralist vision of mathematics. I will assume that the
reader has a passing familiarity with the basic motivations and platitudes
of mathematical structuralism. I will therefore introduce ideas that seem
relevant as I go, and avoid a systematic treatise. But let me draw here the
basic distinction that will frame my analysis. This is the distinction be-
tween property and object structuralism.4
For concreteness, start with standard Zermelo set theory. To get the
ball rolling, I am happy to grant that Zermelo set theory is true and epis-
temically secure. Now, we can find many models of, say, the second-order
Peano axioms among the Zermelo sets. These models might represent the
4The terminology isn’t standard. It lines up roughly with the more common
eliminivist/non-eliminitivist distinction (e.g Parsons, 1990; Cole, 2010), but I frame
things in a way particularly relevant to my current needs. Perhaps the most useful
overview and classificatory discussion is in (Reck and Price, 2000).
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natural numbers, but no one of them is the natural numbers. That is what
Benacerraf’s famous argument (Benacerraf, 1965) seems to show. If Zer-
melo set theory is a foundation for mathematics, it isn’t because things
like the natural numbers are among its objects. But that isn’t the only way
in which Zermelo set theory might be foundational. The basic structural-
ist point of view is that number theory is about the structure that all these
models have in common. Zermelo set theory could still be ‘foundational’
in that it allows us to get at this structure. (Note I will thus always distin-
guish between ‘models’ or ‘systems’ on the one hand and ‘structures’ on
the other; the former ‘exemplify’ or ‘instantiate’ the latter.)
What sort of thing is this structure? We might start by talking about
the structural properties of the various models. Theorems of of arithmetic
express such properties. A model of the Peano axioms consists of a set X ,
a function f : X → X , and an element 0 ∈ X . One axiom of arithmetic is
the sentence
(1) ¬∃(x ∈X ).(0= f (x)).
This expresses a relation between X , f , and 0, and so a property of the
system. This property is instantiated whenever X , f , and 0 form a model
of the natural numbers. It is a structural property.
At a first pass, then, the structure of the natural numbers is just the con-
junction of the structural properties. By property structuralism I mean the
view that mathematics is about set-theoretic models and their structural
properties. According to property structuralism, Zermelo set theory is
not an ideal foundation for mathematics. It is not a ideal foundation be-
cause the properties of systems that are definable in Zermelo set theory
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are not always structural. For example, ‘containing {{;}}’ is not a struc-
tural property of natural numbers systems. Some models contain {{;}},
and others do not. Of course, that doesn’t mean that one can’t get along
using Zermelo set theory. One just has to be careful not to dwell on non-
structural properties.
One way to be careful, formally, would be to devise a language in which
only structural properties can be expressed. Theories expressed in such a
language would attribute to their objects only structural properties. The
objects might, to be sure, have other properties as well. But, according to
property structuralism, they simply aren’t part of mathematics. I men-
tioned that an important aspect of homotopy type theory is its relation-
ship with categorical set theory. One of my main arguments will be that
a certain version of categorical set theory provides this kind of property-
structuralist language.
Property structuralism doesn’t give a simple account of what we are
doing when we talk about ‘the natural numbers’. When I say ‘zero is not a
successor’, I could be doing one of (at least) two things. I could be saying of
some particular model (X , f , 0) that (1) is true. But that particular model
has no particular claim to be called ‘the natural numbers’. Or I could be
making a universally quantified statement that (1) is true of all models of
the natural numbers. But, still, there is no particular thing that is the natu-
ral numbers. The very natural numbers are eliminated, either in favour of
some particular (but basically arbitrary) model, or by means of universal
quantification. We are still not talking about the natural numbers. This
is an important objection to property structuralism. I will return to it in
Chapter III.
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In contrast to property structuralism, what I will call object structural-
ism seeks to preserve the natural numbers as a genuine object of study. This
object is an ‘ante rem structure’ in the terminology of Shapiro (1997).5 In
particular, the ante rem structure of the natural numbers is the intended
model of arithmetic. This model is not among the Zermelo sets. But Zer-
melo set theory could still be a foundation for object structuralism. We
could still get at the natural numbers themselves by abstracting from the
models of arithmetic in Zermelo set theory. It would again be incumbent
upon us to prescind from the non-structural features of Zermelo sets. Ob-
viously, though, Zermelo set theory cannot be an ideal object-structuralist
foundation, because it does not directly describe ante rem structures.6
If object structuralism is right, it would be more perspicacious to re-
place the formal theory of Zermelo sets by a formal theory of ante rem
structures. On the face of it, Shapiro suggested a way to do this in his
book (Shapiro, 1997, ch. 3). But, as Shapiro himself emphasised, this was
just a superficial reworking of set theory. If Awodey is right that in homo-
topy type theory ‘mathematical objects simply are structures’, then per-
haps HOTT is a better formalisation of object structuralism. That is what
we have to see.
It must be emphasised that there are serious objections to the cogency
of object structuralism. Many of them are summarised in (MacBride, 2005).
I will touch on some of these objections as we go, but it is not my business
5I will continue to use the phrase ‘ante rem structure’ because, like Shapiro’s, each of the
structures is supposed to come along with a system of places that themselves exemplify
the structure. But I will not pay much attention to the question of ontological priority
suggested by the phrase ‘ante rem.’
6Shapiro (Shapiro, 2005) explains a slightly different way in which Zermelo set theory
could play a foundational role in structuralist mathematics. We might try to specify a
structure axiomatically, but our success in this will depend on whether the axioms are
consistent or ‘coherent’ in some more general sense. Model theory gives us a way to
study this coherence.
3. PROSPECTUS 14
here to seriously debate the merits of object structuralism. On the other
hand, it would represent some progress to see how homotopy type theory
articulates, or fails to articulate, a version of the object-structuralist view.
3. Prospectus
Now let me turn to an outline of this paper. I will develop and examine
the ideas behind homotopy type theory in three stages.
In the first stage (Chapter II), I consider categorical set theory. As I
have mentioned, HOTT builds upon CST, which has its own claims as a
structuralist foundation. My aim here is two-fold. First, I want to lay
groundwork for the discussion of HOTT. Second, I want to evaluate CST
on its own terms. The baseline sense in which CST is ‘structuralist’ has, I
think, been correctly diagnosed by McLarty (2004). It embodies property
structuralism. I consider, and reject, some epistemic criticisms of CST as a
foundation. But my main argument is that property structuralism places
strong constraints on the formal development of the theory. In particular,
it seems that we must abandon identity predicates between sets, and this
in turn requires the use of a language with ‘dependent types’.
Such a language is the heart of Martin-Löf’s intuitionistic type theory
(MLTT), which I discuss in the second stage (Chapter III). I make clear
how MLTT — with set identities omitted7 — is naturally viewed as a devel-
opment of CST along the lines drawn in Chapter II. However, it also intro-
duces some new features. The new feature most immediately relevant to
the structuralist interpretation is the use of names for specific structurally-
characterised types. For example, MLTT appears to name a specific set of
7There are two standard flavours of MLTT — ‘extensional’ and ‘intensional’ — distin-
guished by their treatment of identities between sets. Homotopy type theory ultimately
develops the intensional version, but, at this stage in the argument, I want simply to omit
set identities.
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natural numbers, whereas CST, as I present it, posits the mere existence of
an appropriate system. At first sight, this suggests that MLTT has made the
leap from property structuralism to object structuralism. However, I argue
that the object-structuralist interpretation may not be mandatory at this
stage, as long as we attend carefully to the semantic role of singular terms
in a property-structuralist language.
In the third stage (Chapter IV) I explain how homotopy type theory
builds upon my identity-free version of Martin-Löf type theory by reintro-
ducing identities between sets. Crucially, this identity predicate satisfies a
skeletal axiom, standardly known as Univalence. It says that equinumerous
sets are equal, and entails in some generality that isomorphic systems are
equal. It is this feature that led Awodey to describe HOTT as an articulation
of structuralism.
There is a surface reading of HOTT according to which the inference
rules for equality are broadly intuitionistic. I will explain how to reject
this view, although this rejection leaves open a number of interpretive is-
sues. The biggest of these is that the skeletal axiom forces typing to be
intensional: even though sets S and T may be equal, there may be no well-
typed equations between elements of S and elements of T . How should we
interpret this? I suggest an interpretation that arises fairly naturally from
an object-structuralist point of view. This strikes me as the best hope for a
structuralist interpretation of homotopy type theory. But I also consider
the view that the set-identity predicate of homotopy type theory does not
express identity at all.
In Chapter V, I give a preliminary discussion of some problems for fu-
ture work. First, I consider the question of when models of different the-
ories have the same structure. Does homotopy type theory help us here?
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Second, I consider the way in which HOTT generalises set-theory to homo-
topy theory, and speculate about the implications of this generalisation for
the structuralist interpretation.
Chapter VI is the conclusion.
CHAPTER II
Categorical Set Theory
As I explained in the introduction, some of the structuralist flavour of
HOTT comes from its close relation to categorical set theory. The best-
known form of CST is Lawvere’s ETCS, the elementary theory of the cate-
gory of sets. I will discuss a version of it here.
The basic difference between Zermelo set theory and categorical set
theory is that the former takes as primitive the idea of one set being a
member of another, while the latter takes as primitive the idea of a function
from one set to another. In section 5 of this chapter, I will discuss the
relative priority of these approaches, but, for now, let us examine their
effects.
In Zermelo set theory, sets are characterised by their extensions. For
example, ‘the set of natural numbers’ might be defined inductively by
0 :≡ ; and (n+ 1) :≡ {n} or 0 :≡ ; and (n+ 1) :≡ n ∪{n}
or by some similar device. Different such definitions attribute to the nat-
ural numbers different properties: on the first definition, for example, 3 is
an element of 4, but not on the second. These properties that vary from
one model to another are non-structural. Moreover, these non-structural
properties seem inappropriate to the natural numbers. It is a category mis-
take to ask after the elements of the number 4.
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In contrast, categorical set theory takes as primitive the notion of func-
tion. Each function has a domain and codomain; functions can be com-
posed. This language of functions, domains, codomains, and composition,
is the language of category theory.1 Categorical set theory is the theory,
in that language, of a particular category, the category of sets. Roughly
speaking, this means that in CST, we can only characterise the set of natu-
ral numbers in terms of the functional relations in which it stands. Such
relations are inevitably structural. So, at least, say the basic platitudes of
category-theoretic structuralism.
My goal in this chapter is to look more closely at these platitudes. The
main argument is that CST has potential as a property-structuralist founda-
tion (see ch. I.2), but this potential can only be fulfilled if category theory
is formulated in a language with strict type distinctions. That conclusion
will motivate, in the next chapter, the formalism of dependent type the-
ory. In §5 I return to the issue of whether CST depends metaphysically and
epistemically on Zermelo set theory.
1. The Two-Sorted Theory of Categories
Let me start with a quick exposition of the standard theory of cate-
gories. A category involves ‘objects’ and ‘morphisms’ between them. The
preeminent example is the category of sets (as objects) and functions (as
morphisms). As one might expect from this example, each morphism f
has a domain d (F ) and a codomain c(F ), which are objects. If d ( f ) = c(g )
then f and g can be composed to form a new morphism f ◦ g . And each
object X has an identity morphism idX .
1One theme of this chapter is that there are several languages in which one can formulate
category theory — I will be interested in which one is best for structuralism.
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Following this sketch, the theory of categories is usually presented as
a theory in a first-order language with two sorts, O for objects andM for
morphisms,2 along with four function symbols
d c id ◦
The language also contains identity predicates on O and on M . More
precisely ‘d ’ and ‘c ’ are function symbols of typeM → O , and ‘id’ has
type O → M . On the other hand, ‘◦’ is to represent a partially defined
function M ×M → M . Namely, f ◦ g is to be defined if and only if
d ( f ) = c(g ).3
The axioms state that the identity morphisms are units, i.e.
f ◦ idd ( f ) = f = idc( f ) ◦ f
for all morphisms f , and that composition is associative, i.e.
f ◦ (g ◦ h) = ( f ◦ g ) ◦ h
for any composable morphisms f , g , h — in other words, whenever d ( f ) =
c(g ) and d (g ) = c(h).
2To say that the language has two sorts means, semantically, that a model will have two
domains of individuals; syntactically, each variable or constant must come with a specified
domain or ‘type’. For this purpose I write ‘x : O ’ to mean that x has type O , and so on.
In contrast, I try to reserve ‘∈’ to represent the membership relation in the theory. It is
possible (as in the original presentation (Lawvere, 1964) of ETCS), to formulate category
theory in a language with a single sortM of morphisms — the usual kind of first-order
formal language. For my present purposes, using a one-sorted theory would obscure
rather than resolve the key issues.
3Of course, more formally, we could define ◦ in terms of a primitive ternary relation
α( f , g , h) of three morphisms, read as ‘h is the composite of f and g ’. It would be gov-
erned by axioms
∀( f , g , h :M ).[α( f , g , h)→ d ( f ) = c(g )]
∀( f , g :M ).[d ( f ) = c(g )→∃!(h :M ).α( f , g , h)].
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2. Structural Properties and the Object Identity Problem
I take the basic motto of category-theoretic structuralism to be that
‘isomorphic objects have all the same properties’. Granted that the prop-
erties shared by isomorphic objects are ‘structural’, the claim then is that
all properties are structural. For example, McLarty writes:
The theory ETCS is structural in the sense that each ETCS
set provably has all the same properties as any set isomor-
phic to it. (McLarty, 2004, p. 48)
Here is a slightly different explanation:
[Categorical foundations like ETCS] are structuralist in
this precise sense: They attribute only structural proper-
ties to their objects, that is, only isomorphism-invariant
properties. (McLarty, 2005, p. 53)
Note the equivocation between what properties objects have and what
properties a theory attributes to them. At a formal level, certainly, ‘the
properties’ McLarty has in mind are just the ones definable in the language
of category theory. It is a further metaphysical claim that the definable
properties are the properties according to some suitably thick notion of
‘property’.
I will consider this metaphysical claim in §5. Although I am sympa-
thetic to it, I do not consider it a fundamental part of category-theoretic
structuralism. In particular, I leave open for now the more conservative
view that the objects of CST are just the Zermelo sets with all their ex-
tensional properties. On this conservative view, using category theory is
mainly a linguistic maneuver to facilitate the study of structural proper-
ties; category-theoretic structuralism is a version of property structuralism
in the sense of ch. I.2.
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In summary, the basic thesis of category theoretic structuralism has
two parts: first, that the definable properties of objects are isomorphism in-
variant; second, that the isomorphism-invariant properties are ‘structural’.
I will focus on the first of these claims, and take the second for granted; but,
as I must briefly explain, even the latter requires a pinch of salt. That’s be-
cause ‘isomorphism’ is a technical term defined in the language of category
theory, and may be interpreted in ways that, on the face of it, have nothing
to do with structure. In any categoryC , an isomorphism is defined to be
a morphism with an inverse. That is, f is an isomorphism if and only if
∃(g :M ).[d (g ) = c( f )]∧ [c(g ) = d ( f )]
∧ [g ◦ f = idd ( f )]∧ [ f ◦ g = idc( f )].
In standard cases, this is exactly what we want. For example, an isomor-
phism in the category of groups is a bijective map that suitably relates the
two group operations. We can uncontroversially say that isomorphism
between groups entails sameness of group-structure. This success, how-
ever, depends on the fact that morphisms between groups are defined to be
structure-preserving according to some antecedent criteria. For the most
part, I am happy to focus on such standard cases. With that in mind, let me
return to the main claim that all properties definable in category theory
are isomorphism-invariant.
Here is McLarty’s version of the claim (adapted from (McLarty, 1993)).
THEOREM II.1. Let Ψ(X ) be a sentence in the language of category the-
ory, with a single free variable X of type O . Suppose that o1, o2 are isomorphic
objects in some category C ; then Ψ(o1) is true if and only Ψ(o2) is true.
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Here is the proof. We have the usual model-theoretic notion of an
isomorphism between categories C and D.4 For such an isomorphism
F , Ψ(o1) is true if and only if Ψ(F (o1)) is true. So it suffices to exhibit
an automorphism F of C such that Ψ(o1) = o2. To do this, choose any
isomorphism u from o1 to o2. For any object o of C , let uo = u if o = o1,
uo = u
−1 if o = o2, and uo = io otherwise. Then here is a suitable F :
(1) F (o1) = o2 and F (o2) = o1; otherwise, F (o) = o.
(2) For any morphism f , F ( f ) = uc( f ) ◦ f ◦ u−1d ( f ).
It is easy to check that this is in fact an automorphism of C .
However, this theorem does not go far enough. The further diffi-
culty is quite simple: the language of two-sorted category theory contains
an identity predicate for objects, and this predicate is not isomorphism-
invariant. That is, if A= B and A′ ∼=A, it does not follow that A′ = B .
Call this the Object Identity Problem.
3. Three Possible Solutions
3.1. Monadic Predicates? The difficulty just described did not affect
the theorem, because the theorem concerned monadic predicates in the
pure language of categories, i.e. predicates with a single argument and no
constants; it therefore excluded predicates like
Eq(A,B) :≡ (A= B)
(construed either as a two-place predicate of variables A and B or as a
monadic predicate of A defined in terms of a constant B). McLarty appears
4That is, an isomorphism F is a bijection between the objects of C and those of D, as
well as between the morphisms of C and those of D, such that (1) F (ido) = idF (o) for
every object o of C ; (2) c(F ( f )) = F (c( f )) and d (F ( f )) = F (d ( f )) for every morphism
f of C ; and (3) F ( f ◦ g ) = F ( f ) ◦ F (g ) for all composable morphisms f , g of C .
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to endorse this as an appropriate restriction on the structuralist thesis. He
writes:
The point is that. . .objects do “differ” in that each is itself
and is not the others; but do not differ in terms of any
property stateable without specifying particular objects.
(McLarty, 1993, fn. 5)
However, I claim that even if we stick to monadic predicates, the theo-
rem does not go far enough. The problem can be framed in different ways
depending on the sense in which we understand category theory as a foun-
dation. My point of view in this thesis — because of its direct relevance to
HOTT — is that ordinary mathematics is to be developed set-theoretically;
what makes the approach ‘category-theoretic’ is the use of the category
of sets (i.e. sets and their functional relations) rather than the cumulative
hierarchy of sets (i.e. sets and the membership relation).5 For example, a
group will be a set G with some additional data, that data being specified
in the language of the category of sets. But then the definable properties of
groups are not merely the ones definable in the language of the category of
groups, but the ones definable in the language of the category of sets. For
example, ‘having five elements’ is a mathematically interesting, monadic,
and indeed isomorphism-invariant, property of groups; but it cannot be
defined using only the language of the category of groups. The structural-
ist motto must be so construed: we want to know that isomorphic groups
satisfy the same predicates in the language of the category of sets. The the-
orem does not give us what we want.
5Awodey (2004) has tried to articulate a very different view of the foundational role of
category theory.
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Here is a more detailed example of what can go wrong, simpler than the
example of groups, but still — as we will see — mathematically interesting.
Start with objects A,B in some category. Let us say that a span (over A and
B) consists of an object X and two morphisms f , g from X to A and from







Thus the property of being a span is just
isSpanAB(X , f , g ) :≡ (d ( f ) = d (g ) =X )∧ (c( f ) =A)∧ (c(g ) = B).
We can now consider the category of spans. Naturally enough, a mor-
phism of spans from (X , f , g ) to (X ′, f ′, g ′) is a morphism F from X to













Such a morphism between spans comes out to be an isomorphism just in
case F is an isomorphism between X and X ′.
Now, we know from the theorem that isomorphic spans (X ′, f ′, g ′)
and (X , f , g ) have the same properties expressible in the language of the
category of spans. But, using the language of the category of sets, we can
define
(2) Bad(X , f , g ) :≡ (X = c( f )).
This is a monadic predicate of spans that is not isomorphism-invariant.
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EXAMPLE II.2. Let A= B =X = {;}, and let X ′ = {{;}}. Let f : X →
A, g : X → B , f ′ : X ′ → A, g ′ : X ′ → B be the unique functions (unique
because the codomains are singletons). Then (X , f , g ) and (X ′, f ′, g ′) are
isomorphic spans, yet Bad(X , f , g ) is true and Bad(X ′, f ′, g ′) is false.
The problem here is really a form of Benacerraf’s objection. Models
of the second-order Peano axioms, being isomorphic, of course satisfy the
same properties expressible in the language of those axioms. The origin
of Benacerraf’s objection is that those models are also Zermelo sets, and
the different models differ in their Zermelo-set-theoretic properties, i.e.
extensionally. In the present scenario, isomorphic spans of course satisfy
the same properties expressible in the language of the category of spans (at
least to the extent of Theorem II.1). But those spans are also constituted
by objects and morphisms in the category of sets, and differ with regards
to the properties expressible there.
Benacerraf’s original objection may appear to be more acute, because
we commonly speak of ‘the’ natural numbers, implying that these are spe-
cific mathematical objects (so, seemingly, specific sets). No doubt the an-
cient pedigree of the natural numbers as objects of mathematical inter-
est does sharpen the point. Still, a look at mathematical practice finds a
similar grammatical phenomenon in the case of spans. A span (X , f , g )
is said to be a product (of A and B) if it satisfies the following property
isProductAB(X , f , g ):
For any span (X ′, f ′, g ′), there exists a unique morphism
of spans from (X ′, f ′, g ′) to (X , f , g ).6
6Thus, formally:
isProductAB (X , f , g ) :≡ (d ( f ) = d (g ) =X )∧ (c( f ) =A)∧ (c(g ) = B)∧
∀(X ′ : O , f ′, g ′ :M ).[(d ( f ′) = d (g ′) =X ′)∧ (c( f ′) =A)∧ (c(g ′) = B)]→
∃!(F :M ).(d (F ) =X ′)∧ (c(F ) =X )∧ ( f ′ = f ◦ F )∧ (g ′ = g ◦ F ).
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It is common among mathematicians to refer to ‘the’ product of A and B .
For example, when it comes to sets, ‘the’ product A×B of A and B is said to
be the set of ordered pairs (a, b ) with a ∈A and b ∈ B . What justifies this
use of the definite article? Whatever the explanation, this example seems
to be on a par with the example of ‘the’ natural numbers. Just as the Peano
axioms determine ‘the’ natural numbers up to unique isomorphism, but
no more, so too the definition of ‘product’ determines ‘the’ product up
to unique isomorphism, but no more. (As I will argue in §5, ‘the set of
ordered pairs’ is no more uniquely defined than is ‘the product’.)
Let me sum up. McLarty implies that category-theoretic structural-
ism is vindicated by the fact that the monadic predicates of objects define
isomorphism-invariant properties. But the predicates for which this is true
are the ones in the language of the category of the objects in question.
The monadic predicates of these objects in the language of sets may not
be isomorphism-invariant. So, taking the category of sets as a foundation,
the overall theory may attribute to these objects properties like Bad, ‘state-
able without specifying particular objects’ (McLarty), but nonetheless not
isomorphism-invariant. It of course remains true that the monadic predi-
cates of sets define isomorphism-invariant properties, as in Theorem II.1.
But those properties, which depend only on cardinality, are simply not
rich enough for the development of mathematics.
3.2. Skeletal Axioms? It may seem that there is a cheap solution to
the Object Identity Problem: adopt as an axiom that object-identities are
structural:
∀(X ,Y : O ). (X ∼= Y )→ (X = Y ).
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This is often called a skeletal axiom, the image being that every category
has a ‘skeleton’ consisting of one object of each isomorphism class. This
trick — if it worked — would be formally cheap, but notably changes the
complexion of categorical foundations. For example, it is simply not true
that there is a unique set of each isomorphism-class in the cumulative hi-
erarchy. Adopting a skeletal axiom, it would no longer be tenable to con-
sider that the sets in the category of sets just are the sets of the cumulative
hierarchy.
However, the skeletal axiom is still not enough. It is true that Bad
(2) becomes an isomorphism-invariant property of spans. However, the
problem remains for
Worse(X , f , g ) :≡ (g = idc(g )).
EXAMPLE II.3. Let A= {;} and B =X =X ′ = {;,{;}}. Let f : X →A
and f ′ : X ′ → A be the unique maps, g : X → B the identity map, and
g ′ : X ′ → B the unique non-identity map. Then (X , f , g ) and (X ′, f ′, g ′)
are isomorphic spans, yet Worse(X , f , g ) is true and Worse(X ′, f ′, g ′) is
false.
This shows that the issue is not just about object identities. At least
some equations between morphisms are also problematic, and this prob-
lem is not solved by the skeletal axiom.
This argument sharpens a point made (but then dismissed) by McLarty
(2005, fn. 12). He observed that although the skeletal axiom ensures there
is only one countably infinite set, there will still be many different systems
of natural numbers. These systems of natural numbers differ because their
successor functions differ. McLarty discounted this observation because
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such differences cannot be expressed by a monadic predicate of natural
numbers systems. But Worse is a monadic predicate of spans.
3.3. Dependent Morphism Types. So far I have explained why two
solutions to the Object Identity Problem do not go far enough. The first
restricted the structuralist thesis to monadic predicates; the second adopted
a skeletal axiom.
The third solution is to remove the identity predicate for objects. How-
ever, one cannot do this in a straightforward way. We cannot straightfor-
wardly omit the object-identity predicate from the two-sorted language of
categories, because the very axioms of category theory rely on it. For ex-
ample, the equation
c( f ) = d (g )
uses the object-identity predicate to specify the conditions under which
morphisms f and g are composable. Nor can we simply restrict our struc-
turalist thesis to predicates that are ‘object-identity free’, since (as the ex-
ample of Worse shows) some object-identity-free predicates are problem-
atic. Even if we could do so, the resulting structuralist thesis would be too
weak: important predicates like isProduct contain object-identities.
However, there is a way to distinguish the use of the object-identity
predicate in the good cases (the axioms and isProduct), from the way it is
used in problematic cases (like Bad). In the former, object identities are
only used to restrict the ranges of morphism-variables. We can therefore try
to restrict ourselves to these good cases by enforcing appropriate syntactic
rules. More elegantly, we can obviate the need for object-identities alto-
gether by building such restrictions into the variable types. The result will
be a dependently typed language. Such languages were originally developed
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by Makkai (1995) under the name FOLDS (first order logic with dependent
sorts).7
Here is how it works. To begin in the material mode, we can divide
the sortM of morphisms into subsorts consisting of morphisms with the




M oo′ , M oo′ := { f ∈M : [d ( f ) = o]∧ [c( f ) = o′]}.
Now forget aboutM itself and take the variousM oo′ as primitive: there is
to be one sort O of objects and many sortsM oo′ of morphisms, indexed by
pairs of objects. Each morphism-variable is to range over a specified one of
these sorts. Crucially, we only allow equations between morphisms, and
only between morphisms of the same type. We can still quantify over all
morphisms by first quantifying over pairs of objects:
∀(o : O ).∀(o′ : O ).∀( f :M oo′) · · · .
To specify the language formally (the complacent reader may skip to the
next paragraph!) we begin with a type O . We will have variables but no
other terms of typeO . For any terms o1, o2 of typeO , we have a typeM o1o2 .
Such a type is said to depend on o1 and o2.
8 Given a term o of type O there
is a term ðidoñ of typeM oo . Given terms o1, o2, o3 of type O and terms f , g
of typesM o2o3 andM o1o2 respectively, there is a term ð f ◦ gñ of typeM o1o3 .
As for sentential formulae, given terms o1, o2 of type O and f , g of type
M o1o2 , we have a wff ð f = gñ. We can combine wffs as usual in proposi-
tional logic. The only not-quite-obvious rule is for quantifiers: we must
7Makkai had essentially our current purposes in mind; he gives a highly abbreviated ver-
sion of the current argument at (Makkai, 1995, p. 7).
8Note thatM o1o2 , as a linguistic type of terms, is specified by the variables o1, o2, not by
their semantic values. Two such types are the same iff they depend on the same variables.
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bind morphism-variables before we bind their domains and codomains. So
given a wff F with a free variable f of typeM o1o2 , ð∀( f :M o1o2 ).F ñ is a wff.
And given a wff F with a free variable o of type O and no free variables
of type depending on o, then ð∀( f :M o1o2 ).F ñ is a wff. (The same rules go
for ∃.)
Examples are more useful. In this language, the axiom of identity is
∀(o1, o2 : O ).∀( f :M o1o2 ).( f ◦ ido1 = f = ido2 ◦ f ).
Similarly, the axiom of associativity is
∀(o4, o3, o2, o1 : O ).∀( f :M o3o4 ).∀(g :M o2o3 ).∀(h :M o1o2 ).
f ◦ (g ◦ h) = ( f ◦ g ) ◦ h.
Here again is the key point: in these axioms, the only use of the identity
predicate is between morphisms of the same type. In particular, there is no
use for an identity predicate onO . The language also suffices to express the
proposition that X , f , g are a product of A and B . As before, I will treat
A and B as parameters; the arguments X , f , g have types O ,M XA ,M XB re-
spectively. Note that being a span is a trivial condition on X , f , g ; or,
better, to say that X , f , g are a span is just to declare the types of these
terms. With this in mind, isProductAB(X , f , g ) has the concise form
isProductAB(X , f , g ) :≡∀(X ′ : O , f ′ :M X ′A , g ′ :M X
′
B ).
∃!(F :M X ′X ).( f ′ = f ◦ F )∧ (g ′ = g ◦ F ).
(3)
(Note that the ‘unique existence’ quantifier ∃! is defined using an identity
predicate — but again only between morphisms of the same typeM X ′X .)
In contrast, the problematic predicate Bad(X , f , g ) irreducibly involves
object-identities. In the two-sorted language, I defined it by the formula
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ðX = c( f )ñ, or equivalently by ðX =Añ. In the dependently-sorted lan-
guage, we no longer have a ‘codomain’ function c , but the second version
still makes sense — or would make sense if we had an object-identity pred-
icate. We do not.
What about the other problematic predicate Worse(X , f , g ) given by
ðg = idBñ? This predicate does not contain an object-identity predicate.
Here is how the current typing system solves the problem. Since (X , f , g )
is to denote a span, the variable g must have typeM XB , while idB has type
M BB . Thus the formula ðg = idBñ is not well-formed (cf. fn. 8.)
3.4. Conclusion. The upshot of this discussion is that category the-
ory is best formulated in a dependently typed language. In doing so, we
can ensure that
(1) The only identity predicates relate morphisms of the same type.
(2) All properties of interest, like isProductAB , are definable.
(3) All definable properties and relations are isomorphism-invariant.
Let me expand upon that last point, in case the general statement is not
clear. A predicate Ψ in the dependently typed language of categories will,
in general, take as arguments some objects Ai : O and some morphisms
f nj k :M
Aj
Ak
(with i , j , k , n taking on finitely many values). Suppose we are
given some objects Bi : O and isomorphisms Fi :M AiBi . Then the claim is
that
Ψ(. . . ,Ai , . . . , f
n
j k , . . .) is true iff Ψ(. . . ,Bi , . . . , Fk ◦ f nj k ◦ F −1j , . . .) is true.
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4. The Category of Sets
As advertised, the basic kind of ‘categorical foundations’ I will consider
is the kind that develops mathematics set-theoretically – that is, in the lan-
guage of the category of sets. In this section, I give a partial development
of the theory of that category. My goal is, first, to make clear the eventual
connection between this theory and HOTT; and second, to address some
objections that have been raised to using categorical set theory as a foun-
dation. I discuss those objections in section 5.
4.1. The Structure of Sets. Let me address a preliminary concern.
Remember that by ‘the category of sets’ I mean the category with sets as
objects and functions as morphisms. Recall that, as a fallback position,
these sets could be the same things studied in Zermelo set theory. Having
defined the category of sets in this way, it follows that an isomorphism
between sets is a bijection, and therefore that equinumerous sets have the
same structure.
But is that really true of Zermelo sets? One might think that the struc-
ture of a Zermelo set actually determines its extension. Put it this way:
if ZST is a piece of mathematics, and mathematics attributes to its objects
only structural properties, then the extension of a Zermelo set had better
be structural. This becomes even more plausible if we picture Zermelo
sets as trees.9 The children of the root node correspond to the members of
the set. The children of those nodes correspond to their members, and so
9A tree is a combinatorial system consisting of ‘nodes’. There is a ‘root’ node, and each
node has some other nodes as ‘children’ (or ‘branches’). The exact details do not matter
here.
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The natural way to define a morphism between trees is as a function be-
tween nodes, mapping the root to the root, and preserving the relation of
parent to child. Two sets come out isomorphic as trees if and only if the sets
are extensionally equal. There really is no bar to thinking of the extension
of a Zermelo set as part of its structure.
Why then do we claim that equinumerous sets have the same structure?
In the face of this question, we might try to throw away the crutch of
Zermelo set theory and announce that CST reflects some totally different
conception of sets; these sets don’t have the kind of tree structure Zermelo
sets do. I will consider such a move in section 5.
But I think the right answer is simpler and more pragmatic. It may be
befuddling to ask what the structure of a set is — is it the tree structure,
or merely the cardinality? — but everyone agrees what the structure of
(say) a group is. The structure of a group does not include the tree struc-
ture of the underlying set; nor does the structure of the natural numbers.
When we are use set theory as a foundation for studying these structures,
whatever tree structure there may be really is irrelevant. When we do Zer-
melo set theory as mathematics, the tree structure becomes the very thing
of interest. And that’s just fine: we can study trees in CST.
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4.2. The Theory of Sets. Now let us look at what categorical set the-
ory is actually like. A number of different but equivalent axiomatisations
are possible (and, too, a variety of extensions have been proposed). The
choice of axioms can be guided by different criteria. One criterion is that
the axioms should be more or less independent, not only in the logical
sense, but in the conceptual sense that the generalisation obtained by omit-
ting one or more of the axioms remains mathematically interesting. This
criterion, undoubtedly valuable for some purposes, misleads for others.
In the case of the category of sets, the axioms are typically formulated in a
way that generalises to the theory of toposes (e.g. Mac Lane and Moerdijk,
1997); thus the axioms describe a ‘well-pointed W-topos with axiom of
choice’. The term ‘well-pointed’ here means roughly that a morphism can
be understood as a relation between elements of its domain and elements
of its codomain — as one would expect when a ‘morphism’ is a function
between sets. This axiom, once given, allows for the rest of the theory to
be developed in terms of elements and functions as mappings between el-
ements. However, this is not the usual route. Rather, one usually defines
what a topos is, in general, and then adduces well-pointedness almost in
passing. And this gives rise to the impression that one is supposed to grasp,
understand, or justify the axioms independently of the thought that sets
have elements and that functions are mappings between elements. As I will
later explain (§5), this has been considered to weigh against categorical set
theory on epistemic grounds.
Thus my strategy in this section is to give axioms that are stated pri-
marily in terms of elements. This puts categorical set theory on firmer
epistemic ground than is generally recognised. It may, for some tastes,
not be enough; afterwards I will discuss some of the remaining epistemic
4. THE CATEGORY OF SETS 35
quandries. It must also be admitted that there is still something formally
awkward about the way elements are treated in CST. This is arguably a
point on which HOTT will offer much improvement.
The axioms can be divided into two groups. The axioms under head-
ing I below below ensure that elements and functions behave as expected;
those under heading II postulate the existence of certain sets. More pre-
cisely, they postulate the existence of sets satisfying certain properties that
characterise them up to isomorphism. In a sense, then, they only postu-
late the existence of certain cardinalities; they have the flavour of axioms
of infinity.
I. Elements and Functions
The first step is to explain why the language of the category of sets is
rich enough to speak about the elements of sets. (It must be done. But the
reader convinced that it can be done might well skip to heading II.)
1. SINGLETONS AND ELEMENTS.
First we characterise the singleton sets.
DEFINITION II.4. An object A is singleton (or, in the usual categorical
terminology, terminal), if and only if it receives a unique function from
every object:
∀(X : O ).∃!( f :M XA ).
This brings us to the first axiom:
AXIOM II.5. There exists a singleton set.
Now suppose that we fix upon a singleton set — call it 1. We expect
that for any set S, the functions 1→ S exactly correspond to the elements
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of S. We have a typeM 1S of such morphisms; so this type parameterises
elements of S. It is convenient to refer to the elements of this type simply as
elements of S. But it must be bourne in mind that if 1′ is another singleton
set, thenM 1′S has equal claim to be ‘the’ type of elements of S.
This is not supposed to mean that S has elements relative to the choice
of a singleton set. There are a number of ways to explain what it is sup-
posed to mean; but this is the basic awkwardness of categorical set theory.
Perhaps the most obvious move would be to postulate, for each object S,
a sort ES of ‘elements of S’, and to add axioms that allow one to pass from
M 1S to ES , for any terminal object 1. To look ahead, this is essentially
what is done in HOTT. But, by introducing the element sorts ES , it takes
us beyond the pure language of categories I am considering here.
Still, the reason that we can at least make do with the pure language
of categories is that, if we fix upon a singleton set 1, we can quantify over
elements of S. When convenient, then, I will write
s ∈ S
to mean that s is an element of S (i.e. a morphism of typeM 1S ). The partic-
ular choice of a singleton set is ‘harmless’ in the sense that any singletons
1 and 1′ have all the same definable properties (since, as follows directly
from the definition, they are isomorphic, and indeed uniquely so). If you
and I happen to choose different singleton sets, there is a unique way to
translate between us. I will come back to this issue in Chapter III. For
now let us simply suppose that 1 is some particular singleton set.
2. FUNCTION EXTENSIONALITY AND PLENTITUDE.
Moving on, then, we expect that a morphism should determine a map-
ping between elements. And that is just what happens. Given f :M ST and
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s ∈ S, we obtain f (s) :≡ f ◦ s ∈ T . We can then ask whether f is injective
( f (s) = f (s ′)→ s = s ′); we can ask whether a given t ∈ T lies in the image
of f (∃(s ∈ S). f (s) = t ); and if every t lies in the image of f , we can say
that f is surjective. So we are off and running.
However, we don’t just expect that morphisms should determine map-
pings. They should be individuated the same way mappings are: by their
values. This is essentially the key ‘well-pointedness’ axiom, which I will
call by the more intuitive name ‘Function Extensionality’.
AXIOM II.6 (Function Extensionality). Morphisms f , g :M ST are equal
if and only if f (p) = g (p) for all p ∈ S.
This allows us to understand a function as a relation or correspondence
between elements in the usual way. The next axiom allows functions to
be defined by formulae. In standard treatments it is a theorem instead of
an axiom — note how it, like Function Extensionality, uses the notion of
‘element’ in a fundamental way.
AXIOM II.7 (Function Plenitude). Suppose Ψ is a binary predicate on
sets A and B.10 Then
[∀(a ∈A).∃(b ∈ B).Ψ(a, b )]→ [∃( f :M AB ).∀(a ∈A).Ψ(a, f (a))].
In other words, if Ψ determines at least one b for every a, then there is
a function f mapping as to b s. Two points to note. First, if Ψ determines
a unique b for every a — so that b ‘depends functionally’ on a — then
Function Extensionality ensures that the f is unique. Thus one may gen-
uinely define functions by formulae. Second, Function Plentitude entails
10In other words, it is a sentence with two free variables of typeM 1A andM 1B .
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a standard version of the axiom of choice: every surjective function has a
right-inverse.
II. Existence Axioms
Now that I have explained how to talk about functions and elements
in the category of sets, let us look at its basic ontology.
3. CARDINALITY 0 AND CARDINALITY 1
AXIOM II.8. There exists a set 0 with no elements, and [to repeat:] a set
1 with exactly one element.
4. CARDINAL ADDITION
Suppose that sets A1 and A2 have cardinalities #A1 and #A2 respectively;
we expect there to be a set of cardinality #A1 + #A2. This means we can
partition the set into two parts, one of which is isomorphic with A1 and
















FIGURE 1. A coproduct A1 tA2.
DEFINITION II.9. A set A1tA2 is the coproduct (or disjoint union) of
A1 and A2 with respect to functions in1 :M A1A1tA2 and in1 :M
A2
A1tA2 if every
element of A1 tA2 is uniquely of the form in1(a1) or in2(a2).
(These ‘in1’ and ‘in2’ are the first and second inclusions.)
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AXIOM II.10. For any sets A1 and A2 there is a coproduct A1 tA2.
5. CARDINAL MULTIPLICATION.
For any sets A1,A2 we expect there to be a set of cardinality #A1×#A2.
What this means is that it is the right size to parameterise ordered pairs
(a, b ).
DEFINITION II.11. A set A1×A2 is a product of A1 and A2 with respect
to pr1 :M A1×A2A1 and pr2 :M
A1×A2
A2
if for each a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 there is a
unique (a1,a2) ∈A1×A2 such that pr1(a1,a2) = a1 and pr2(a1,a2) = a2.






















FIGURE 2. A product A1×A2.
AXIOM II.12. For any A1 and A2 there is a product A1×A2.
The notion of a product was already introduced (3) for objects in an
arbitrary category. The characterisation of ‘the product of two sets’ I have
used here only really works in the category of sets, since it talks about
elements of objects. But it is not hard to check that any A× B , pr1, pr2
satisfying Definition II.11 is indeed a product in the general sense, using
Function Extensionality and Function Plenitude.
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6. CARDINAL EXPONENTIATION.
For any sets A,B , we expect there to be a set of cardinality #B#A — that
is, of the right size to parameterise functions from A to B .
DEFINITION II.13. For any A,B : O , BA is a mapping set with respect
to an ‘evaluation’ morphism eval: BA×A→ B if
∀( f :M AB ).∃!(α ∈ BA).∀(a ∈A). eval(α,a) = f (a).
AXIOM II.14. For any A,B : O , there is a mapping set BA, eval .
Note that, strictly speaking, the mapping set is also relative to the
choice of a particular product BA×A. Just as all the singleton sets were
isomorphic, and so indiscernible, so too are all the products isomorphic
and indiscernible. But it is still an awkward situation. I return to this issue
in III.1.2.
7. COMPREHENSION.
Given a set A and a predicate Ψ on A, we expect there to be a set with
the same cardinality as the Ψs. Although I will call this an ‘extension’ of
Ψ, it needn’t somehow consist of the Ψs; it just has to map injectively onto
them.
DEFINITION II.15. Suppose that Ψ is a predicate on A. Then a set EΨ
is an extension of Ψ with respect to u :M EΨA if and only if u is injective and
∀(a ∈A).[Ψ(a)↔∃(x : EΨ).u(x) = a].
AXIOM II.16 (Comprehension). Suppose Ψ is a predicate on a set A.
Then Ψ has an extension.
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8. INFINITY.
We expect there to be a countably infinite set.
DEFINITION II.17. A set N is a ‘natural numbers object’ with respect
to 0 ∈ N and succ :MNN if it satisfies the second-order Peano axioms. (In
the following form: succ is injective; 0 is not in the image of succ; and for
any set K and f :M KN , if 0 is in the image of f and succ(n) is in the image
of f whenever n is, then f is surjective.)
AXIOM II.18 (Infinity). There exists a natural numbers object.
POWER SETS AND OTHER OBJECTS. Standard axiom sets postulate the
existence of a ‘power set’ P (A) for each set A, or else the existence of a
‘sub-object classifier’ — roughly, a set of truth values. The two are related
in that if T is a sub-object classifier, then T A is a power-set for A. We
do not need an additional axiom for this; any two-element set will do for
T . For example, 1t1 will do. The use for such an object will reappear
dramatically in ch. III.3.
5. Is Categorical Set Theory Autonomous?
It is time to revisit the relationship between CST and Zermelo set the-
ory. Again, my fallback position is that the objects of categorical set theory
just are Zermelo sets. What makes categorical set theory special is that it
adopts a language in which only structural properties can be expressed.
On this view, sets have non-structural properties, but they are not math-
ematically interesting. (Again, I don’t mean by this that ZST isn’t mathe-
matically interesting. I mean that the non-structural properties of sets are
not relevant for the use to which sets are typically put in mathematics.)
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Thus the fallback position is that categorical set theory embodies property
structuralism.
Objections can be raised both to property structuralism in general and
to this version of property structuralism. I will consider some of the each
kind in Chapter III. First I want to examine the prospects for a more ambi-
tious reading of categorical set theory. This more ambitious reading would
make three claims. First, it would deny that the objects of CST are Zermelo
sets. Second, it would deny that our grasp of these objects and their prop-
erties depends on our grasp of Zermelo set theory. Third, it would claim
that CST articulates a version of object structuralism (cf. I.2).
Let me begin with the third claim. The idea would be that, not only
are all the properties definable in CST structural, but that these definable
properties are the only properties its objects have. As McLarty says, when
we speak the language of CST, we are not ‘ignoring’ anything about the
objects in question (McLarty, 1993, p. 496). Here are two reasons for scep-
ticism. First, the version of CST I have arrived at does not have an identity
predicate for sets. This is not particularly troubling if we are just formally
excluding equations from our language. But the object-structuralist seems
to claim that there is just no question of whether sets A and B are equal.
That is strange. The second feature of CST that should trouble the object-
structuralist is the complicated system of types. The metaphysical import
of type distinctions has never really been clear, but the situation here is
particularly egregious. If A is a set and B is a set, and a is an element of A
and b an element of B , then there seems to be no question of whether a
equals b . One might have thought, ‘Well, at least if A equals B we can ask
whether a equals b .’ But there is no question of whether A equals B ! It
is hard to take this seriously as more than a linguistic gambit to rule out
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non-structural predicates. (Getting around these problems is the key to the
object-structuralist reading of homotopy type theory; that is the subject
of Chapter IV.)
Note that this line of criticism tells less strongly against the idea that the
sets of CST have only structural properties. The big problem came when
we considered more complicated systems constructed from sets, like spans.
Only then did we abjure object-identities and embrace dependent typing.
The two-sorted version of CST is metaphysically less mysterious, and it
assigns to sets themselves only structural properties, at least to the extent
of Theorem II.1. It is possible to take seriously the idea that this basic
version of CST articulates a sui generis (and perhaps object-structuralist)
conception of sets.
That leads me back to the first two ‘ambitious’ claims. I will frame the
discussion using some objections raised by Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011).
They question the ‘conceptual’ and ‘justificatory’ autonomy of CST from
Zermelo set theory. They summarise the general issue like this.
[A] putative foundation for mathematics must boast more
than mere logical autonomy with respect to [Zermelo]
set theory if it is to be truly autonomous. It must be
possible not only to formulate the foundation without
presupposing a theory of sets; it must be possible also to
understand it and to justify its claims without such a pre-
supposition. (Linnebo and Pettigrew, 2011, p. 241)
I will consider whether categorical set theory, as I presented it, can meet
these conditions of autonomy. Before doing so, it is worth emphasising
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again that this kind of autonomy is not really necessary for most ‘foun-
dational’ purposes. First, from the point of view of property structural-
ism, category theory provides a way of restricting attention to the struc-
tural properties of set-theoretic systems; moreover, experience has shown
it to be an effective way of studying those properties. None of that would
change if the underlying sets were Zermelo sets and had to be understood
as such. Second, even if we do deny that the sets of CST are Zermelo sets,
questions about their nature are somewhat independent of questions about
how we grasp their properties. Perhaps the axioms of CST really do point
to some distinctive entities; perhaps they are cardinality structures in the
sense of Shapiro, or else sets of lauter Einsen in the sense of Cantor.11 Still,
it might be that we grasp the properties of these objects by abstracting from
Zermelo sets, and that we must point to Zermelo sets (or, just as likely, sets
of concreta) when justifying our foundational axioms. As an analogy, we
may well understand and justify arithmetic by counting beans; it doesn’t
follow that natural numbers are beans or that the Peano axioms are foun-
dationally suspect.
The Linnebo-Pettigrew objection can thus only clarify and limit, ra-
ther than overturn, the foundational project of categorical set theory. With
that in mind, let me turn to the specific objections raised against (first) the
conceptual autonomy, and (more briefly) the justificatory autonomy of
categorical set theory. On conceptual autonomy, Linnebo and Pettigrew
consider two particular objections. The first (which they attribute to Dan
Isaacson) is that
11As it is frequently suggested: see e.g. (Lawvere, 1994) and (Linnebo and Pettigrew,
2011).
5. IS CATEGORICAL SET THEORY AUTONOMOUS? 45
whenever we come to explain these axioms to those un-
familiar with them, we inevitably appeal to the member-
ship relation, the subset relation, the notion of ordered
pair, the notion of a function as a set of ordered pairs, and
so on. That is, at the point of explanation, the mapping-
theoretic presentation is abandoned in favour of a more
orthodox presentation, which is required to allow us to
understand the axioms. Thus, ETCS does not have con-
ceptual autonomy. (p. 242)
Part of the response to this objection must be that the sets of CST do have
members, and we are allowed any explanation that relies on that fact. The
question, when it comes to membership, is whether membership between
sets is necessary for an understanding of the axioms. And it does not seem
to be.
For example, it is perfectly clear that the product axiom is motivated
by ‘the notion of ordered pair’. That is, we can try to understand the
product of A and B as the set of ordered pairs (a, b ). On first glance, this
appears to be an extensional definition, the sort of thing that makes sense
in Zermelo set theory but not in CST. But that is not true. It is not an
extensional definition until we say what ‘(a, b )’ means. In Zermelo set
theory, it must denote a set. And Benacerraf’s objection applies to or-
dered pairs just as much as it applies to natural numbers: there are many
ways to encode an ordered pair as a set, but seemingly no set that the or-
dered pair is. For example, the ordered pair (a, b ) of any two sets a and
b is typically said to be {{a},{a, b}}, following Kuratowski. But there is
something fundamentally arbitrary about this expression. It is no part
of any prior conception of ‘ordered pair’, for example, that {a} ∈ (a, b ),
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even though this holds on Kuratowski’s definition. Nor does it seem to
be something that we might discover to be true. After all, what makes it
the case that (a, b ) is {{a},{a, b}} rather than {{a, b},{b}}, or indeed (fol-
lowing Wiener) {{{a},;},{{b}}}? With the latter two definitions, it would
not be true that {a} ∈ (a, b ). Kuratowski’s pairing is, pretty obviously, a
matter of convention.
Moreover, how does one verify that Kuratowski’s definition is an ad-
equate one? First, one observes that any a ∈ A and b ∈ B determine a
unique Kuratowski pair. Then one checks conversely that any Kuratowski
pair comes from a unique a ∈ A and b ∈ B . But this is just another way
of saying that the set (A× B)K of Kuratowski pairs comes with functions
pr1 : (A× B)K → A and pr2 : (A× B)K → B such that for each a ∈ A
and b ∈ B there is a unique Kuratowski pair x such that pr1(x) = a and
pr2(x) = b . The existence of appropriate functions pr1 and pr2 is the cri-
terion for any definition of ‘ordered pair’ in Zermelo set theory to be for-
mally adequate. To be precise, it isn’t the mere existence of pr1 and pr2 that
matters. Consider again the question of {{a},{a, b}} versus {{a, b},{b}}.
According to the Kuratowski choice of pr1 and pr2, the first of these is
(a, b ) and the second is (b ,a). It is not the extension of the set (A×B)K of
Kuratowski pairs that makes it the product of A and B as opposed to the
product of B and A. It is only the product vis a vis particular choices of
pr1 and pr2.
In short, we understand that Kuratowski’s definition provides a rea-
sonable analysis of ordered pairs just because it satisfies the definition of
a product used in categorical set theory. The notion of ordered pair is
something conceptually independent of Zermelo set theory; if anything,
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the notion of a product set used in CST must be used to explain the use of
Kuratowski pairs.
Essentially the same point can be made about appeals to ‘the notion
of a function as a set of ordered pairs’. In the first case, I do not know
that anyone conceives of functions as sets of ordered pairs; we constantly
distinguish between functions and their graphs. Second, even if a function
were a set of ordered pairs, it would not follow that a function is a set of
Kuratowski pairs. That is, the notion of ‘ordered pair’ that allows us to
conceptualise graphs of functions is certainly prior to the way in which
ordered pairs and functions are encoded in Zermelo set theory. The en-
coding of functions as sets of ordered pairs (of any sort) has a conventional
aspect to it. As Lawvere (1964, p. 12) mentions, functions could be repre-
sented equally well by their ‘cographs’ rather than their graphs.12 There is
nothing that makes the set of graphs, rather than the set of cographs, the
set of functions between A and B . Both count as mapping sets because they
stand in appropriate relations to A and B . Categorical set theory precisely
spells out what relations are required (Definition II.13). If we admit that it
is legitimate to think of the set of graphs as a mapping set, then we should
admit that what makes it legitimate are the functional relations described
in categorical set theory.
There is, perhaps, one case in which ZST might seem to have concep-
tual priority: the case of power sets. The power set of X has a very natural
extensional definition as ‘the set of all subsets’ of X . However, the fact
is that this extensional definition does no work in ordinary mathematics.
12The cograph of a function f : X → Y is a set of subsets of the disjoint union X tY . A
subset of X tY belongs to the cograph of f if and only if it contains a single element y
of Y and the preimage of y under f .
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Instead of the set of all subsets of X , one could consider the set of all char-
acteristic functions on X . The set of subsets and the set of characteristic
functions both stand in the relevant functional relations to X . Both can
play the role of ‘power set’. Based on what I have said, the notion of a
set of characteristic functions is conceptually independent of Zermelo set
theory.
The second objection considered by Linnebo and Pettigrew (which
they attribute to John Mayberry) is also relevant here.
The objector submits that the only precise account of the
notion of mapping that captures the level of idealization
that is required in modern mathematics is given by the
definition of a function as a set of ordered pairs that repre-
sents a many-one or one-one relation, and this definition
belongs essentially to orthodox set theory.
The response of Linnebo and Pettigrew is adequate here: CST theorises
about functions axiomatically rather than by reducing them to something
else. To that I can add that the representation of a function by a set of or-
dered pairs is entirely available in CST: each graph defines a function, each
function a graph. But CST gives the correct account of why this happens:
the set of graphs ‘is’ a set of functions because it satisfies Definition II.13.
In summary, I think that the case for the conceptual autonomy of cate-
gorical set theory is very strong. At a minimum, the traffic goes both way.
The concepts of categorical set theory explain why it is we use Zermelo set
theory the way we do. But the question of justification is more difficult.
What the use of Kuratowski pairs does in ZST is establish the existence of a
product set. It does so on the basis of general principles of comprehension
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(cf. Boolos, 1971). In contrast, CST simply postulates that products exist.
There may be a naturalistic justification for such existence claims, its being
undeniable that mathematicians systematically make use of product sets.
But, as Linnebo and Pettigrew rightly point out, if one wants a detailed
account of such existence claims even within mathematical practice, it is
hard to see past Kuratowski pairs. Similar worries apply to sets of func-
tions. Encoding functions by their graphs, and forming the set of all such
graphs, gives a detailed justification for the exponential axiom.
However, the situation is not so clear-cut. It is bound to be controver-
sial what counts as a justification and how much detail is required. True,
the iterative conception of sets yields a general story about existence claims;
but what justifies the iterative conception? One might contend that the
particular existence axioms of CST are just as clear.
Here are two brief stories along those lines. I do not claim that either
of them is completely satisfactory; the question, in relation to Zermelo set
theory, is whether they are more or less mysterious than the distinction be-
tween several objects on the one hand and the single set that ‘collects’ them
on the other. The first story was urged on my by David Wallace. On this
story, the categorical conception of sets is that sets are the domains and
codomains of functions. If we know what functions are, then we know
what binary functions are; there must exist product-sets as their domains.
Mapping sets are the domains of higher-order functions, and, perhaps, so
on. The second story hews more closely to the version of categorical set
theory I presented in this chapter. This story emphasises that the existence
axioms are pure cardinality claims. We take cardinality as the basic con-
cept. Once we have fixed on A and B , anything of the right cardinality will
do as A× B . The cardinality of a disjoint union At B is the sum of the
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cardinalities of A and B ; the cardinality of A×B is their product; and the
cardinality of AB is the exponential. The main existence axioms of CST
assert the possibility of cardinal arithmetic. To be sure, this is not a de-
tailed justification for such axioms. The iterative conception of sets gives
a longer story about how to construct such cardinals. But it would suffice
to get them any way we can.13
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, categorical set theory is best understood as a property-
structuralist, rather than object-structuralist, foundation. To fulfill even
this property structuralism, we must resort to dependent typing. On my
fallback view, the sets of CST just are Zermelo sets; but there is also scope
for a more ambitious view according to which the sets of CST are sui gene-
ris, and according to which their monadic properties are structural. More-
over, we can grasp, and perhaps even justify, the axioms of CST without
reference to Zermelo set theory.
13One alternative to ZST in this role might be plural quantification and mereology, as
suggested in (Hellman, 2006).
CHAPTER III
Martin-Löf’s Dependent Type Theory
In the previous chapter, I explained how and why one might develop
categorical set theory in a first order language with dependent sorts (Mak-
kai’s FOLDS). It would be interesting to examine Makkai’s project in its
own right, but homotopy type theory leads us down another path.
Homotopy type theory differs from categorical set theory in FOLDS in
four main ways. Three of them are inherited from Martin-Löf’s dependent
type theory (MLTT), on which HOTT builds. First, the existence axioms are
explicitly constructive. For example, HOTT has a name ð1ñ for a terminal
object, whereas CST, at least in my presentation of it, merely posited that
such an object does exist. Second, HOTT uses a system of universes, instead
of a single domain of sets. Besides extending the ontology, this effectively
makes HOTT into a higher-order theory.1 Third, instead of building on a
background logic like FOLDS, HOTT includes logic by introducing a type
of propositions (roughly: truth values) on a par with the other objects of
the theory.
In this chapter, I investigate these three features of HOTT. Perhaps the
most important argument for the big picture is contained in section 4.
There I reject an intuitionistic reading of dependent type theory.
1Makkai saw FOLDS as a first-order fragment of Martin-Löf type theory (which preceded
it). That may be formally right, but I think it more informative to say that FOLDS is
a relative of first-order logic, while Martin-Löf’s theory is a relative of set theory (or of
other traditional type theories).
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I leave to subsequent chapters an investigation of the fourth important
feature, which distinguishes HOTT from the basic version of dependent
type theory: its treatment of identity between sets.
1. Two More Problems for Categorical Set Theory
In this section, I consider criticisms of categorical set theory that mo-
tivate two of the novel features of dependent type theory: the use of uni-
verses, and the use of constructive existence axioms.
1.1. Hellman’s Open-Endedness Objection. One of the key discus-
sions of category-theoretic structuralism is contained in the exchange be-
tween Hellman (2003), Awodey (2004), and McLarty (2004, 2005). Many
of Helmann’s objections traded on the idea that the axioms of category the-
ory are to be understood schematically, much like those of group theory.
He argued that, as such, they could not play a foundational role. Awodey
effectively denied the inference, while McLarty responded that, on his un-
derstanding of the position, the foundation is not category theory per se,
but theories of specific categories, like the category of sets. McLarty’s is
the point of view adopted here: CST plays the foundational role, and this
blocks most of Hellman’s original objections.
One objection remains. As Hellman later wrote
What remains problematic. . . regarding [CST] is its appar-
ent commitment to a fixed, presumably maximal, real-
world universe of sets, “the category of sets”. This just
strikes me as a convenient fiction. (Hellman, 2006, p. 6)
It is important to note that his concerns apply to Zermelo set theories just
as much as to CST. He is more specifically worried about two features of
the situation. The first is the plurality of set theories:
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First, there is the question of multiplicity of conceptions
of sets, e.g. non-well-founded as well as well-founded,
possibly choice-less as well as with choice. . . . Presum-
ably, all of these conceptions are mathematically legiti-
mate, and it would be arbitrary to treat just one as onto-
logically privileged.
I responded to similar concerns in ch. II.4. One way to study sets mathe-
matically is by adopting them foundationally, as the raw material of math-
ematics. But another is to represent their structure using whatever raw ma-
terials one has at hand. One can study different conceptions of sets math-
ematically the same way one can study unicorn populations mathemati-
cally. Categorical set theory provides enough raw materials to do so. Its
sets are not privileged ‘ontologically’ but pragmatically: they provide for
the perspicacious development of contemporary mathematics and, in par-
ticular, for the study of structural properties.
Hellman’s second concern is more serious.
Whatever domain of sets we recognize can be transcended
by the very operations that set theory seeks to codify, col-
lecting, collecting everything “already collected”. . . . Set
theoretic structuralism can be faulted precisely for fail-
ing to apply to set theory itself, especially in regard to
the very multiplicity of universes of sets that it naturally
engenders. Categorical structuralism promises to do bet-
ter, but it is hard put to keep that promise if it falls back
on a maximal universe of sets or, more generally, on an
absolute notion of “large category.” (pp. 6–7)
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The initial formulation here does not sit well with categorical set theory:
it is not obvious that categorical set theory seeks to codify ‘collecting’;
that is, rather, the aim of Zermelo set theory. But the last sentence of the
quotation suggests a particular form of the problem to which the category-
theoretic structuralist should feel more sympathy. Not only does one want
to consider groups as structured sets, one would also like to consider the
category of groups in its own right. But if this is in some sense a collec-
tion of structured sets, it is not itself a set. There are actually two difficul-
ties here. First, there is the usual cardinality worry, that the collection of
groups is too large to be a set. Second, there is a worry about extension-
ality: what does it mean to speak of ‘the category of groups’ if we eschew
extensional definitions of collections?
The method of universes addresses the first of these worries (and I will
say something about the second in ch. V.1). Instead of a single domain O
of ‘all’ sets, the theory posits a sequence
U ⊂U ′ ⊂U ′′ ⊂ · · ·
of increasingly large universes, each containing its predecessor as an ob-
ject.2 Each universe satisfies the axioms of categorical set theory: any two
objects inU have a product inU , and so on. One always quantifies over
one of the universes; there is no way to quantify over their union. Thus,
while one can’t talk about the category of absolutely all groups, one can
talk about the category of all groups (implicitly: in the universeU ); it is
2For a good account of universes in set theory see Feferman (2004). Roughly speaking,
the universes are a hierarchy of inaccessible cardinals.
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a category whose sort of objects is an element of U ′. It is, of course, le-
gitimate to ask whether this method of universes is ultimately satisfactory.
But it does overcome a narrow reading of Hellman’s objection.3
1.2. Existence and Reference. There is an unresolved awkwardness
in my presentation of categorical set theory. It had several mere existence
axioms, stated (if informally) in the pure language of categories. For ex-
ample: for any A and B there exists a product set. In contrast, one could
introduce into the language a function symbol× for forming new sets from
pairs of old, and take it as an axiom that A× B is a product set of A and
B with respect to certain morphisms. It is undeniable that the latter ap-
proach better reflects ordinary mathematical reasoning.
The evidence for this can be found even in my presentation of the the-
ory. To define the elements of a set, I effectively introduced a constant 1
for a singleton set. To define mapping sets, I effectively introduced a partic-
ular product BA×A. And so on. I could have done otherwise, and worked
very strictly within the unadulterated language of category theory. For
example, when defining the notion of a product, instead of saying that any
a1 :M 1A1 and any a2 :M 1A2 come from a unique (a1,a2) :M 1A1×A2 , I could
have said that for any terminal object 1, and any a :M 1A. . . . You could read
me as implicitly replacing constants by appropriately bound variables. Do-
ing this would be harmless as far as the Object Identity Problem goes, once
we have got rid of object-identity predicates. But doing it explicitly would
have made my presentation of the theory much different. More impor-
tantly, it would be a significant (if tedious) undertaking to recast ordinary
3The reader may note a certain tension between my responses to the two long quotations
from Hellman. One way to study the category of all groups in U is to include it in a
larger universeU ′. But another way is just to represent it in the basic universeU . This
second strategy is one possible spin on Awodey’s ‘top-down’ categorical structuralism
(Awodey, 2004). Still, there may be occasions on which when one really needs more raw
material.
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mathematics in this way. Although apparent reference to (say) ‘the prod-
uct of A and B ’ can be removed from mathematical discourse by appro-
priate quantification, this paraphrasing seriously misrepresents ordinary
mathematical reasoning (Breckenridge and Magidor, 2012).
As I said, it is possible to develop a version of categorical set theory
with constants rather than with mere existence axioms. Roughly speak-
ing, Martin-Löf’s type theory follows this route. However, such a move
requires interpretation. There is a serious tension between the introduc-
tion of a function symbol × into the language, on the one hand, and the
view I took on product sets in ch. II.5, on the other. The obvious ex-
planation of talk about ‘the product of A and B ’ is that the term ðA×Bñ
has some specific intended interpretation — the very set of ordered pairs.
But, on the contrary, I have argued that ‘the set of ordered pairs’ does not
latch onto any particular thing, at least in Zermelo set theory. The phrase
‘ordered pair’ does not pick out some particular things that can then be
collected in a set; rather, any set potentially counts as a set of ordered pairs
vis a vis some functional relations.
Now, in the end, HOTT provides a distinctive way of resolving this
tension. On the face of it, at least, A and B have a unique product in HOTT.
That is, there is only one object that stands in the right relations to A and
B . So one can legitimately refer to the product of A and B . A natural
interpretation, inspired by ante rem structuralism, is that ðA×Bñ refers
to the structure had by any product of A and B ; the thought is that this
structure itself counts as a product. That is the picture I investigate in
Chapter IV. However, while we are making the transition from categorical
set theory to homotopy type theory, it is worth asking whether the use of
constants in CST can be defended in its own right. I think it can, and that
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must qualify the structuralist motivation for homotopy type theory. The
defence I have in mind would legitimate the use of ðA×Bñ as (something
like) a singular term, while denying it any specific intended referent.
The idea is that the language of category theory is so peculiar that sin-
gular terms may not have quite the semantic roles that we expect. Al-
though it is not true that any two products of A and B are equal, they
aren’t not equal either, as far as the language goes; there is no identity pred-
icate to relate them. Since there is no question in the language of whether
A× B is one product versus ‘another’, it is not obvious why the seman-
tic role of A× B must be to refer to one product versus another — even
if such distinctions can be drawn in the metalanguage. A bit more con-
cretely: the ‘semantic role’ of ðA×Bñ is something like the way in which
ðA×Bñ contributes to the truth conditions of sentences containing it. For
example, suppose that ðΨ(JC)ñ is true if and only if Ψ is true of Caesar;
this determines Caesar as the referent of ‘JC’ precisely because Caesar is
discernible using various predicates Ψ. The semantic role of ‘JC’ is also
‘complete’ in the sense that nothing must be added to determine the truth
values of sentences containing it. In contrast, the semantic role of a vari-
able x is ‘incomplete’: sentences ðΨ(x)ñ only have truth values relative to
an assignment, or, better, when the sentence is completed by quantifica-
tion.
Here is the view that I suggest.4 The semantic role of ðA×Bñ is like
that of ‘JC’, and unlike that of x, in that it is complete. Every sentence
4The more general views of (Shapiro, 2012) and (Breckenridge and Magidor, 2012) sim-
ilarly trade on novel semantics. My view seeks to exploit a very special feature of the
situation, namely the linguistic indiscernibility of objects.
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ðΨ(A×B)ñ has a truth value, and there is no need to paraphrase or sup-
plement such a sentence with quantifiers. But ðA×Bñ is nonetheless un-
like ‘JC’ in that no unique object is appropriately coordinated with those
truth values. Of course, certain objects — the products — are relevantly
coordinated with the truth values; but not one product instead of another.
The point, of course, is that the products are indiscernible in the formal
language; one might say that ðA×Bñ refers undiscerningly to the products
of A and B . The semantic role of ðA×Bñ licenses all the usual reasoning
about ‘the’ product of A and B ; but we should not necessarily conclude
that this semantic role is like that of ‘JC’ in all respects.
I warned that the sketched account would tend to undermine the mo-
tivation for object structuralism and the move to homotopy type theory.
The reason should now be clear. Part of the motivation for object struc-
turalism is to provide a specific intended referent for (say) ‘the natural num-
bers’. But perhaps we can explain the definite article by other means. On
the first account I considered, apparent reference to the natural numbers
is to be eliminated in favour of universal quantification over natural num-
bers systems (pace McLarty, 1993, fn. 7). But this misrepresents ordinary
mathematical reasoning. On my second, preferred account, it is entirely
legitimate to speak of ‘the natural numbers’. This isn’t because there is
a specific intended referent; we don’t really need one, as long as we are
speaking a language in which all the systems of natural numbers are in-
discernible. Whether this view ‘eliminates the natural numbers’ depends
what one means by ‘eliminate’. The view maintains that ‘the natural num-
bers’ has a complete semantic role, but it denies that ‘the natural numbers’
is a singular term in exactly the sense of ‘JC’.
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2. Types and Terms
Now I sketch the formal development of MLTT (following Chapter 1
of UFP and Martin-Löf (1984)). Most of the ideas are already on the ta-
ble. However, we need some grasp of the formalism to properly appreci-
ate what is going on in HOTT, and in particular to understand the logical
calculus. That will the subject of section 3.
Universes. I will only really need to refer to the first two universes,
which I will denote byU andU ′. Each of these are types of types, in the
sense that if A is a term of typeU , then we may also have terms of type A.
The ‘small’ universeU is supposed to be an element of the ‘large’U ′, and
so, in the formal mode, ðU ñ is a term of typeU ′. ButU ′ is also supposed
to subsume U ; this means that any term of typeU also counts as a term
of typeU ′.
Types. As for the basic existence axioms, we are given constants
0 1 N
of typeU , to denote the empty, unit, and natural numbers objects. And
whenever A,B are terms of type U (or, mutatis mutandis, U ′), we have
terms
A×B AtB A→ B
again of type U . (Notation: A→ B corresponds to the mapping set BA
from categorical set theory. And in UFP coproducts are written as sums.)
A small generalisation is in order: we will be allowed indexed products and
coproducts. This means that when we have a type F (a) :U depending on
a : A, we are allowed to form the product or coproduct of the F (a) as a
varies. We could have allowed such constructions in categorical set theory,
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but they would necessarily have been schemata.5 They are more naturally
expressed in a system with universes. To say that F (a) depends on a is just







are also terms of typeU .
The method by which these types are characterised, however, differs
significantly from the method used in categorical set theory. In CST we had
a background theory — category theory — governing the primitive object
and morphism sorts and the functions id,◦. The specifically set-theoretic
objects were characterised in terms of this primitive ontology by means
of axioms expressed in first-order logic. Even the elements of objects were
described in terms of this background ontology. In contrast, MLTT forgoes
the background theory and even the background logic. Each term X of
typeU admits terms of type X , not to be analysed in terms of morphisms
from a terminal object; the theory then characterises the basic objects by
syntactic rules for term-formation. It will be easiest to see what this means
by example.
The key example is provided by the function types. MLTT provides as
a rule of syntax that given a term A :U , one can form a term idA of type
ðA→Añ (the identity function). Similarly, there is a rule that given a term
a of type A and a term f of type A→ B , one can form a term f (a) of type
B . Contrast to the situation in CST: there, category theory provided, for
each A : O , a term idA of typeM AA ; the axioms governing mapping sets
then entail that there is an appropriately corresponding element of any
mapping set AA. The fully-spelled-out explanation of function evaluation
5The existence of indexed coproducts is a version of the replacement axiom, which is a
schema in first-order Zermelo theory.
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would be even more complicated. In MLTT there is no place for morphism-
types distinct from the mapping sets, and this is a great simplification.
It would be interesting to analyse how this method of characterisation
works. However, that analysis would take me too far away from the main
line of inquiry here. (In particular, a presentation of the full rules in logical
order would require a discussion of identity, which I am saving for later.)
What I will do is list enough of the term-forming rules to give a flavour
of the theory and to serve my current narrow purposes. I hope, though,
that it will be clear that these characterisations fundamentally agree with
those given in CST. In particular, one should not get the impression that
these characterisations are extensional. For example, we are told that any
term of type A → B can be combined with a term of type A to form a
term of type B . It does not follow that any element of A→ B , perhaps not
given to us as such, is some kind of gadget for converting elements of A
into elements of B . Indeed, in Chapter IV.6, I will deny that it is so.
2.1. Constructing Terms. To the rules, then. As we shall see, it is
highly suggestive to write them in the style of rules of inference in a natural
deduction systems. The ‘premisses’ or inputs are various known terms,
and the ‘conclusion’ or output is a new one. For example, the already-
mentioned rule of function evaluation can be represented thus:
(4)
a : A f : A→ B
f (a) : B
There are other rules, too, including one for forming terms of A→ B by
λ-abstraction; but I pass them over.
As for the singleton set 1, we are given a name for its element:
(5) ∗ : 1 .
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Of course, this element should be unique. But I do not want to make the
detour required to say so formally. We expect that the empty set 0 has no
elements, so we can hardly have a rule for forming terms of type 0. But it
should be an initial object in the sense that it admits a unique function to
every other set. For each A :U we are given a name for that function:
(6) initA : 0→A.
For the product type A1×A2, we can introduce terms as ordered pairs:
(7)
a1 : A1 a2 : A2
(a1,a2) : A1×A2






The indexed products generalise these binary products. Heuristically,
in the case of binary products, we have a type Ai for each i in the index
set X :≡ {1,2}; an element (a1,a2) of the product can be understood as a
function on {1,2}whose value on i is ai . (This is only a heuristic, because
we do not at this point have such a set {1,2} at our disposal!) The indexed
products generalise this to the case of an arbitrary index type X . In fact,
the indexed products are usually called ‘dependent function types’, because
their elements are given by functions on the index type, with the type of
the value depending on the argument. They thus generalise both function
types and product types.
The main rule for indexed products generalises both (4) and (7):
(9)
a : A f :
∏
x:A F (x)
f (a) : F (a)
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Explicitly, this generalises (4) because it says we can ‘evaluate the function
f at argument a’. But it also generalises (7) because it says we can ‘project
the tuple f to its ath component’.
The coproduct A1 tA2 has elements in1(a1), in2(a2) : A1 tA2 for each
a1 : A1 or a2 : A2:
(10)
a1 : A1
in1(a1) : A1 tA2
a2 : A2
in2(a1) : A1 tA2
This generalises to indexed coproducts. A term ini(ai ) : A1 tA2 could be
written as an ordered pair (i ,ai ). For a general index type X , we start from
a function A : X →U . Terms of type ∐(x:X )A(x) can be constructed as
pairs (x,ax) with x : X and ax : A(x). This indexed coproduct thereby
generalises both binary coproducts and binary products; sometimes it is
called a type of ‘dependent pairs’. Generalising (10) and (7), we have a
rule:
(11)













pr2(s) : F (pr1(s)).
I will leave out any discussion of the natural numbers type; suffice to
say that we are given terms 0 :N and succ :N→N.
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3. Logic
So far I have described what types HOTT postulates, and (partially)
characterised them via rules for constructing and manipulating their ele-
ments. To give a fully formalised theory, we have to combine these postu-
lates and rules with a system of predicate logic. (Why not just state the the-
ory in natural language? One reason is that we expect to require strict type
distinctions, which are difficult to enforce in natural languages.) One way
to do this would be to incorporate the basic ontology into a background
system of (say) first order logic. This would bring us back to categorical
set theory à la FOLDS.
The strategy of dependent type theory, however, is slightly different.
It postulates a type Prop of ‘propositions’ — roughly, truth values.6 The
move (which I will not seriously defend) goes back to Frege: we construe a
closed sentence as a name for an element of Prop. Similarly, a predicate Ψ
on A is a ‘propositional function’ A→ Prop. The universal quantification
of such a predicate should again name an element of Prop, so the quantifier
∀(a : A) should be a higher order function (A → Prop) → Prop. Thus
the strategy is to subsume the linguistic rules of sentence-formation under
the general rubric of constructing elements of types. Since we considerU
itself as a type in a larger universeU ′, we even have the freedom to quantify
over propositional functionsU → Prop. The logic is higher-order rather
than first-order in this sense.
What is Prop? In principle, any two-element set would do. According
to HOTT, though, the elements of Prop are the sets with at most one ele-
ment.7 Thus Prop will be a subtype ofU . This answer looks strange, and
6In CST, Prop corresponds to the ‘subobject classifier’. In UFP what I am calling ‘propo-
sitions’ are called ‘mere propositions’.
7The discussion here will have to be informal; at the moment, we can’t say formally what
a ‘at most one’ means! I will clear this up a bit in ch. IV.2.
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I can only partly motivate it. First, a standard heuristic is that the truth
values ⊥ and > are ‘nullary relations’ and so, in extension, subsets of ‘the
nullary product’ 1. We could identify these subsets with 0 (as ⊥) and 1
(as >). But, second, it will turn out in HOTT that all empty sets (being
mutually isomorphic) are equal to 0 and all singleton sets (being mutually
isomorphic) are equal to 1. So we may as well say that Prop contains all sets
with at most one element. A posteriori, this choice of Prop makes good
on the following central idea: the sentence-forming rules just are the stan-
dard type-construction rules and the rules of inference just are the standard
term-formation rules, as applied to propositions.
To see how this works, suppose that P,Q are propositions (again: sets
with at most one element); then the set P → Q of functions is again a
proposition. A moment’s thought shows that P → Q has one element if
and only if P is empty or Q is non-empty. It is naturally interpreted as the
proposition that P implies Q. The function type P → 0 is, similarly, the
proposition that not P , and the product type P×Q is the proposition that
P and Q. Moreover, universal quantification is a kind of infinitary con-
junction, and indeed corresponds to an indexed product of propositions.




x:A F (x). I will therefore adopt the abbreviations
> :≡ 1
⊥ :≡ 0
¬P :≡ P → 0
P ∧Q :≡ P ×Q
P ∨Q :≡ P tQ
∀(x : X )P (x) :≡∏
x:X
P (x)
whenever it is convenient to stress these logical readings of the type-con-
structors. (If you are wondering about disjunction and existential quanifi-
cation, I will get there in a minute!)
This explains what I meant by the claim that the sentence-formation
rules just are the type-construction rules. For example, the rule that one
can form the conjunction of two sentences just is the rule that one can
construct the product of two types. I also claimed that the inference rules
just are the term-construction rules. To see how this works, consider first
the main rule for function types:
(4 again)
a : A f : A→ B
f (a) : B
A proposition holds just in case it is not empty. So, if A and B are propo-
sitions, this rule can be read as modus ponens: from the truth of A and
the truth of A→ B one can deduce the truth of B . In this connection,
(5) asserts the True while the rule (6) is ex falso quodlibet. The rule (9) is
universal elimination. And of course there are other rules.
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In the discussion so far, I have neglected disjunction and existential
quantification. They are definable in the usual way using negation, con-
junction, and universal quantification. But one might expect an alterna-
tive. If we read coproducts as disjunctions, rule (10) looks like ∨-introduc-
tion; rule (11) looks like ∃-introduction. However, conceptually, some-
thing is amiss. On the one hand, we expect that > ∨ > = >; but we
also expect 1t1 to have two elements, not one. 1t1 is not a proposi-
tion. This difficulty infects the term-formation rules, as seen most clearly
in the case of rule (12). Interpreted as an inference, it would pass from
∃(x : A).F (x) to some particular element pr1(s) of A such that F (pr1(s)) is
true. Of course, this is impossible for classical existential quantification; it
is, though, what one would expect for constructive existential quantifica-
tion, and I will come to that shortly.
If we are sticking to classical logic, then we cannot say that disjunction
and existential quantification are special cases of coproducts. Still, we can
see how they should be related to coproducts. Suppose that, for any type A,
we could form a type ‖A‖ — the ‘propositional truncation’ of A — which
is a proposition, and which is empty if and only if A is. In other words,
‖A‖ is the proposition that A is non-empty. Then, simply by counting
elements, we expect to have






whenever P , Q, and all values of F are propositions. We might also guess
that we can define ‖A‖ to be the type ((A → 0) → 0); if everything is
working properly, this latter will have at most one element, and will be
empty if and only if A is.8
8If ð¬Añ is defined in general as A→ 0, we could write ð¬¬Añ for ‖A‖. However, one
may be wary of writing ð¬Añ when A is not a proposition.
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Let me summarise this discussion. I have relied on a certain amount
of prior intuition to get to this point, but the end-result faithfully repre-
sents an orthodox view of HOTT. Among all types, there are some that
are ‘propositions’ (and which are ultimately the sets with at most one el-
ement). The usual type-construction rules amount to a predicate calculus
for these propositions, and the usual element-construction rules give infer-
ence rules. The caveat is that disjunctions correspond to coproducts only
up to propositional truncation (13).9
Finally, a comment about comprehension. In my discussion of categor-
ical set theory, I postulated a comprehension scheme, allowing one to form
the ‘extension’ of a predicate on a set A. In HOTT, we get such a thing au-
tomatically. A ‘predicate’ on A is a term F of the function type A→ Prop.
The extension is then the dependent pair type
∐
a:A F (a), which we could
even call {a : A|F (a)}. We would ordinarily introduce terms of this type
as pairs (a, p) with a : A and p : F (a). But since each F (a) has at most one
element, such terms correspond to the a : A such that F (a) is true.
4. Against Intuitionistic Logic
It emerged in the last section that the construction rules of HOTT take
the form of intuitionistic rules of inference. This is a remarkable fact.
What should we make of it?
There is a radical line of thought, going back to Martin-Löf’s original
work, and the source of much equivocation in UFP. It holds that arbi-
trary types (and not just some special ones) count as propositions, that the
9I alluded to another caveat in the introduction. Namely, one still has to impose the law
of excluded middle (LEM) as an axiom in order to get classical logic. LEM alternatively
follows from a version of the axiom of choice (UFP, ch. 3). In CST the axiom of choice
(part of my Function Plenitude axiom) plays a similar role: it guarantees that the ‘internal
logic’ of the topos is classical. MLTT is essentially the internal logic of the topos of sets
(cf. Awodey (2009)).
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logical functors just are the type-constructors (without any sort of propo-
sitional truncation), and that the inference rules just are the intuitionistic
ones. According to this line of thought, an instance (4) of ‘modus ponens’
with the ‘conclusion’ f (b ) : B asserts (for some sense of ‘asserts’) that f (b )
is a proof of the proposition B . The intuitionistic character of the logic is
explained in terms of what counts as a proof of a proposition of a certain
form (Martin-Löf, 1984, p. 12). For example (the story goes), a proof of
At B is either a proof of A or a proof of B ; so, from (the proof of) the
former one can deduce (a proof of) a determinate one of the latter.
However, I claim that this radical line of thought is, at best, concep-
tually superfluous. While it affirms that types are propositions, it is also




bind variables that range over elements of arbitrary types. My
antecedent concern in this essay is also with types as ‘collections’ rather
than ‘propositions’. But, once we admit ‘types as collections’ then the talk
of ‘types as propositions’ adds nothing but mystification. To give an his-
torical analogy, Frege (1893, §2) recognised propositions (truth values) as
objects on a par with all others. He even defined the logical functors to
apply to any objects, in line with his principle that a function must accept
any object as an argument. In that sense, objects generalised propositions.
Crucially, though, his judgment stroke was always affixed to the horizon-
tal stroke that converted arbitrary objects into truth values. Because of
this, it would be wrong to ascribe to Fregean objects in general the logical
status of propositions.
The same goes here: if A is a collection, what does it mean to assert
that A? What proposition is the natural numbers? What is ‘a proof of
the natural numbers’? The ‘types as propositions’ view in fact forces the
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(That is, one can construct functions in both directions.) According to the
reading of coproducts as existential quantifiers, the right-hand side of the
biconditional represents the proposition that A is non-empty. So too, A
must represent the proposition that A is non-empty. Evidently, then, an
element of A is ‘a proof of A’ just in the sense that it indicates that A is
non-empty. But we need not abandon classical logic to recognise that one
can conclude, given an element of A, that A is non-empty. This inference
is given by ∃-introduction:10
a : A
‖a‖ : ∃(a : A).>
There is no conceptual reason to call A ‘a proposition’ and a ‘a proof of
A’. To be sure, it is a beautiful observation that, because each element of A
indicates that A is non-empty, certain standard methods for constructing
elements of types run in parallel to certain standard inference rules. But
why insist on saying more?
Let me make clear why this critique does not impugn my preferred
view that types with at most one element represent propositions. Only
for such a type A does constructing an element coincide with proving that
A is non-empty; for if A is known to be non-empty one can construct its
element by definite description. Moreover, by definition, such a type A is
10The displayed inference is, more pedantically, from a : A and ∗ :>. Note the conclusion
that A is non-empty can be represented by the displayed existential quantification or by
the propositional truncation ‖A‖; they are logically equivalent and (in HOTT) equal.
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non-empty if and only it represents the True. For these types, and only
for these types, is construction naturally interpreted as proof.
And yet, having said all this, once we are clear on what we are doing, it
is perfectly harmless to talk like a constructivist. I will occasionally do so,
in a well-marked way. For example, if I call P a ‘constructive proposition’
I just mean that P is a type. Do not imagine that a constructive proposi-
tion is genuinely a proposition. If I say that P is ‘constructively true’, I
just mean that there is some particular element of P in the offing. Do not
imagine that the non-proposition P is genuinely true. If I say that P ‘con-
structively implies’ Q, I just mean that we have some particular function
P →Q; do not imagine that constructive implication is a form of genuine
implication. Once one starts, it is easy and useful to go on like this. I will
occasionally indulge, but my general scepticism should be clear.
5. Conclusion
Martin-Löf’s dependent type theory has some advantages over cate-
gorical set theory. Its universes and constants better reflect mathemati-
cal practice. It might appear that the use of constants — for example, a
specific term N for the natural numbers — forces us into an (if anything)
object-structuralist interpretation of MLTT. I argued in section 1.2 that the
situation is not clear-cut. I sketched an idea of how singular terms might
work in categorical set theory without forcing us into metaphysical com-
mitments.
The other main novelty of MLTT is the use of a type of propositions.
There is a conservative version of this move, which preserves classical logic;
but there is also a radical intuitionistic one, according to which every type
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represents a proposition. I argued that this radical version is conceptually
spurious, even as it may provide a convenient way of speaking.
CHAPTER IV
Homotopy Type Theory
In Chapter II, I argued that the structuralist aspirations of categorical
set theory are best fulfilled by a language that eschews the identity predi-
cate for sets. From this point of view, the fundamental novelty of HOTT
is that it reinstates this predicate. The way it does so is what led Awodey
(2014) to declare that in homotopy type theory ‘mathematical objects sim-
ply are structures’. Good news, then, for the object structuralist; but there
is bad news, too, and the identity predicate of HOTT raises subtle interpre-
tive issues. Those issues are the subject of this chapter.
Here is the plan. In section 1 (‘The Good News’) and section 2 (‘The
Bad’), I lay out the most conspicuous features of equality in homotopy
type theory. The bad news is that the spurious intuitionism of ch. III.4
once more rears its ugly head. This leads to a face-value reading of HOTT
according to which the logic of identity is intuitionistic. In section 3 (‘The
Constructive Identity View’) I try to give this reading a fair hearing, but
it must ultimately be rejected. In section 4 (‘The Mere Identity View’)
I show how to do so. In section 5 (‘Object Structuralism. . . ’) I revisit
the problems raised in Chapter II; how exactly is it that HOTT manages
to have object identity predicates? I argue that the key is intensional typ-
ing. But intensional typing is a bit mysterious; it goes with a weakening
of the indiscernibility of identicals. In section 6 (‘Intensional Typing and
Indeterminate Reference’) I sketch a way in which an object-structuralist
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might try to explain intensional typing. Finally, in section 7 (‘Structural-
ism Without Equality?’) I argue that there is unlikely to be a good account
of identity, distinct from the ‘Mere Identity View’, within the framework
of homotopy type theory.
1. The Good News
In Chapter II, I set aside the idea of imposing a skeletal axiom of the
form
(14) A∼= B→A= B .
The reason for setting this aside was that it could not, by itself, solve the
Object Identity Problem. However, the skeletal axiom may have indepen-
dent motivation within a structuralist programme. Roughly, the skeletal
axiom corresponds to the motto that ‘isomorphic systems have the same
structure’. However, a bit of care is needed here. Notice that there is no
overt system/structure distinction in the skeletal axiom; it says that iso-
morphic objects are the same objects. But suppose we accept the object-
structuralist thesis that each structure has ‘places’ that themselves exem-
plify the structure. The skeletal axiom can be taken to express the idea
that structures are equal if they have isomorphic systems of places. This,
I take it, is the structuralist motivation for the skeletal axiom.
Homotopy type theory imposes an axiom of the form (14). It is called
UNIVALENCE. It is asserted of sets, but it turns out — I think it fair to say
miraculously — to apply to more complicated structures as well. Isomor-
phic sets are equal, but so are isomorphic groups, or isomorphic fields.
(However, the phenomenon is not completely general! I will mention
some counterexamples in Chapter V.) For future reference, let me explain
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more carefully what this means. (The impatient reader may skip to the
next section and refer back as necessary.)
Structure-Types. How can we talk about the type of all groups, say,
as a mathematical object? (Remember Hellman’s worry in ch. II.1.1.) The
existence postulates of MLTT allow us to do so. Here is a fairly general
version of the story. Suppose we are interested in models of a theory stated
in a standard (first- or second-order) language with relation symbols
R1, . . . , Rm
of arity a1, . . . ,am, and function symbols
f1, . . . , fn
of arity b1, . . . , bn. Let Ψ be the conjunction of the finitely many axioms.
A model of this theory is an (m+ n+ 1)-tuple
(X , R1, . . . , f1 . . .)
consisting of a set X and some relations and function on it, satisfying Ψ.











· · · ∐
( fn :X bn→X )
Ψ(X , R1, . . . , f1, . . .).
Here X a is the product of X with itself a times. I will say that a type
presented in this form is a structure-type.
1Strictly speaking, a term of the displayed type is an (m+n+2)-tuple (X , R1, . . . , f1, . . . ,∗),
where ∗ is an element of the proposition Ψ(· · · ). But the datum ∗ can be interpreted as
the datum that Ψ(· · · ) is true.
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To give the simplest examples,U itself (or equivalently∐X :U >) is the







is the structure-type of pointed sets. We similarly have the structure-type
of groups, the structure-type of natural-numbers systems, and so on. It
is also easy to generalise this basic notion of ‘structure type’ to include
structure-types of models of (say) many-sorted or dependently-sorted the-
ories. So we have a structure-type of categories, too.
If we have a structure-typeT , with terms A,B , it is easy enough now to
define a type IsoT (A,B) of isomorphisms between A and B in the expected
sense. For example,
IsoPSet(X , x;Y, y) =
∐
f :X→Y
[ f has an inverse ]∧ f (x) = y.
What Univalence implies (UFP, ch. 9.8) is that there is a function
IsoT (A,B)→A= B .
Given my motivation for the skeletal axiom, it might be clearer to think of
the elements of the structure-type of groups (say) as group-structures rather
than mere groups; but I will normally just call them groups, like every-
body else.
2As will appear in the next section, talk of ‘sets’ in this whole discussion should be taken
informally; some elements ofU will not be sets in a technical sense. That leads to some
further, mainly irrelevant subtleties; see for example fn. 6.
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2. The Bad News
Out with it, then: the ‘identity predicate’ of homotopy type theory is
not a predicate at all.
In light of the discussion of intuitionistic logic in ch. III.4, the reader
can anticipate what I mean. The identity of A with B is (apparently) rep-
resented by a type A ∗∗= B , but this type may not be a proposition in the
sense of ch. III.3. (I use the symbol ∗∗= to distinguish this ‘predicate’ from
the version I will favour.)
What should we make of this? That is the central question that any
interpretation of HOTT must face. Until now I have been coy about what
exactly a proposition is in homotopy type theory; I have said that it is ‘a set
with at most one element’, but that characterisation relies on a theory of
identity. To get a grip on the issues at hand, we ought to look a little more
closely at how the theory of identity and the notion of proposition are
supposed to hang together. Then I will turn to questions of interpretation.
Identity, Propositions, and Sets. For any A :U there will be a func-
tion ∗∗= : A×A→U ; thus, for any a, b : A, a ∗∗= b is a type. (The same goes
for the larger universeU ′ in place ofU ; so we could be talking about the
identity ‘predicate’ on U : U ′.) From what I have said, ‘X is a proposi-
tion’ should correspond to the type3
isProp(X ) :≡ ∏
(x,x ′):X×X
(x ∗∗= x ′).
3Recall that
∏
corresponds to universal quantification. I resist writing ‘∀’ here because
the formula being bound is not necessarily a proposition.
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It will come out in the wash that isProp(X ) is itself a proposition (UFP,




Thus, strictly speaking, an element of Prop is given by a pair (X , p) with
X :U and p : isProp(X ). But (again) I interpret the datum p as the datum
that X is a proposition.
Coming full circle, we could take it as an axiom that equations are al-
ways propositions:4
(15) ∀(A :U ).∀(a,a′ : A). isProp(a ∗∗= a′).
This is what homotopy type theory neglects to do. In fact, the theory
defines ‘a set’ to be a type A of which
(16) ∀(a,a′ : A). isProp(a ∗∗= a′)
is true; so the denial of (15) is exactly the mechanism by which HOTT
claims to generalise set theory.
This is where the skeletal Univalence axiom enters in. For A and B in
U , the axiom is actually given by an isomorphism
(17) Iso(A,B)→A ∗∗=B
4Taking a proposition as an axiom means that one assumes given a term of the corre-
sponding type.
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between the type of isomorphisms and the identity type.5,6 Isomorphism is
isomorphic to identity. Since in general there will be lots of isomorphisms
between A and B , this means that A ∗∗= B may not be a proposition. (And
therefore at least the universeU is not a set.)
3. The Constructive Identity View
One possibility is that we should take the situation at face-value; HOTT
demands a constructive reading of identity claims. It is a hard to state
precisely what this means (unless we are to let the formalism speak for
itself). But since it is the face-value interpretation, it deserves a fair hearing.
Let me try.
As a first step, let me explain the analogue for isomorphism rather than
identity. Suppose that A and B are isomorphic sets. The mere statement
that A and B are isomorphic, as usually understood, does not allow us
to pass from elements of A to elements of B . However, there is a different
‘constructive’ understanding according to which ‘A and B are isomorphic’
at least implies that one has in mind a particular isomorphism between A
and B . On this constructive reading of isomorphism claims, one can pass
from elements of A to elements of B using the implied isomorphism. The
logic of isomorphism in this constructive sense is bound to be intuition-
istic. For example, ‘A and B are not isomorphic’ presumably still means
that there is no isomorphism at all between them. But it is then not true
that either A and B are not isomorphic or A and B are isomorphic [and
one has a particular isomorphism between them]. The law of excluded
5As one might expect, the inverse ‘implication’ A ∗∗= B → Iso(A,B) can be constructed
directly from a version of the indiscernbility of identicals (see §5).
6 Note that the definition of ‘isomorphism’ (or ‘equivalence’, as it is usually called in
HOTT) itself involves equality: a function f : A→ B is an isomorphism if there exists a
function g : B → A such that f ◦ g = idB and g ◦ f = idA. This leads to some technical
subtleties; but the basic point is to ensure, by propositional truncation, that being an
isomorphism is a genuine predicate.
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middle thus fails. On the face of it, homotopy type theory takes a similar
constructive attitude towards identity claims.
But there is an obvious disanalogy between identity and isomorphism.
The story about isomorphism rested on a distinction that does not seem to
have an analogue for identity — namely, the distinction between the mere
fact of isomorphism and the existence of a particular isomorphism. What
in the world is ‘a particular identity’? The picture may become slightly
less baffling if we remember that, according to the skeletal axiom, isomor-
phism and identity are equivalent. Remember that Univalence is given by
an isomorphism (17) between the type of isomorphisms and the identity
type. So one formulation of the view is that isomorphism, constructively
understood, is the right notion of ‘identity between structures’. On this
formulation, to ‘assert’ that structures are equal just is to give an isomor-
phism between them.
So much for my attempt to state the view. What about its motivation?
Part of what is driving the view, I suspect, is a mixed bag of notational,
historical, and sociological accident. Moreover, the aim of using HOTT to
do homotopy theory is a confounding factor (for more on which, see §4
and ch. V.2). However, the view is undeniably also driven by a remarkable
feature of contemporary mathematical practice, which is hard to entirely
discount. It is probably best to proceed to an example of a kind ubiquitous
in modern geometry. Suppose I have a manifold M , which is the union of
two overlapping sets M = U ∪V . Suppose I have a (real-valued) function
f on M . It determines, by restriction, functions fU on U and fV on V .
Conversely, functions fU and fV determine a function f , given only that
they are equal on U ∩V . Now modify the scenario. Suppose I have a vec-
tor bundle f on M . It determines, by restriction, vector bundles fU on
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U and fV on V . Conversely, vector bundles fU and fV determine an f ,
given a particular isomorphism between them on U ∩V . So here is the
point: a mere identity in the first scenario has as its analogue in the second
scenario the datum of a particular isomorphism. There is clearly a lot one
could say here, but this sort of example does provide prima facie evidence
from mathematical practice for the view that, sometimes, constructive iso-
morphism claims are the appropriate generalisation of plain-old identity.
As I said, the view is difficult to state precisely; relatedly, it would be
hard to argue for it briefly. But let me tell a story about how one might
come to accept it naturalistically. First, experience might lead one to ac-
cept that contemporary mathematics rarely talks about identity between
systems — but it does construct and keep track of particular isomorphisms
between them. Ubiquitous examples like that above then show how this
mathematical practice is well represented as a kind of constructive rea-
soning about isomorphism which is parallel to classical reasoning about
identity, and indeed can be seen to generalise it. Then one recognises that
this informal reasoning can be perspicuously formalised in a system with
a unified treatment of isomorphism and identity. And then one doesn’t
look back. It just comes out (the story goes) that the best formalisation
of mathematical practice has an identity/isomorphism predicate with in-
tuitionistic inference rules, and that this is the closest thing there is to the
classical identity predicate. The philosopher ought to respect these facts
on the ground.
4. The Mere Identity View
But this must all be misguided, if it asks us to construe A∗∗=B as a propo-
sition. I rehearsed the reasons in ch. III.4.
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In the case of isomorphism, we recognize both the collection Iso(A,B)
of isomorphisms and the proposition that A and B are isomorphic; there
is no conceptual reason to conflate them. So too, we are bound in any case
to recognize A ∗∗= B as a collection, and at that point it is just a matter of
confusion to imagine that this collection is ‘a proposition’ or to imagine
that either its elements or constructions of those elements are ‘proofs’.
At best, we can talk like a constructivist, in the way I describe on p. 71.
Indeed, I will refer to ∗∗= as constructive identity. The only assertable
proposition in the neighbourhood of A ∗∗= B is the non-emptiness of that
type. If anything, then, it must be the propositional truncation
A=B :≡ A ∗∗=B
that represents the identity of A and B . I will call this predicate mere iden-
tity.7 There is no way around this conceptual point. The example from
mathematical practice only goes to show that it may be convenient to talk
like a constructivist from time to time. To take that talk at face value is
confused.
In any case, the evidence from mathematical practice is ambiguous.
For example, people have studied the consistency of HOTT relative to Zer-
melo set theory, by interpreting HOTT in ZFC (Kapulkin et al., 2012, e.g.).
But when they do so, they do not interpret ∗∗= as identity. (Obviously not.
In set theory, identity is a genuine proposition.) These seemingly deviant
interpretations are not only of interest in regards to formal consistency.
As I explained in the introduction, one of the motivations for develop-
ing HOTT is the study of homotopy theory. Now, homotopy theory, as
7In UFP ‘∗∗=’ is simply written ‘=’ and called ‘propositional equality’. This name is se-
riously misleading. In that book, mere identity does not have a name, but what I call
‘propositions’ are there called ‘mere propositions’.
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a standard field of mathematics, has been developed in set theory, and the
interpretations I have mentioned essentially translate between homotopy
theory à la HOTT and homotopy theory à la set theory.8 So, to the extent
that set-based homotopy theory is correct, it looks as if even the intended
interpretation of constructive identity is not identity.
Of course, the reason for doing homotopy theory with HOTT is that
its development in set theory is somehow infelicitous. Probably, then,
we should not take the set-based interpretation of HOTT as literally the
intended model. Still, the point remains that the interpretation of con-
structive identity in HOTT is, to a significant extent, up for grabs.
So, on my preferred view, the proposition A=B represents the equality
of A and B . The ‘good news’ of section 1 is not impugned; my discus-
sion there can be applied to mere identity. But where does this leave the
collection A ∗∗=B? The answer has two parts. First, when A and B are ele-
ments of a set (in the specific sense of §2), mere equality and constructive
equality coincide. That is just what it meant to be a set; in this most im-
portant case, there is nothing to explain. The second part of the answer is
that between sets, we have Univalence, and we can eliminate constructive
equality in favour of isomorphism. Univalence gives an isomorphism be-
tween Iso(A,B) and A ∗∗=B . Constructively speaking, Iso(A,B) even equals
A ∗∗= B . We can use that to eliminate the mysterious elements of A ∗∗= B in
favour of the much less mysterious elements of Iso(A,B). I will discuss this
eliminitive strategy more in section 7. It works, as far as it goes. But it does
not go all the way.
8Here I am referring to ‘set theory’ in general as opposed to specifically Zermelo set the-
ory. The basic picture would remain even if we were to develop homotopy theory within
the set-theoretic fragment of HOTT. The basic idea of this homotopy interpretation is
that each type is interpreted as a topological space. A term e : a ∗∗= b is interpreted as a
continuous path between the points a and b .
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Why not? The problems are of roughly two kinds. First, there are
problems that have a direct impact on the structuralist interpretation with
which I have been concerned. The pre-eminent problem of this kind is
related to the indiscernibility of identicals. That will be the main focus of
the rest of this chapter.
Problems of the second kind bear on how we should interpret the way
in which HOTT generalises set theory to homotopy theory. When we do
so, we will be bound to consider constructive identities A ∗∗=B in which A
and B are neither types nor elements of sets. Then we cannot explain A∗∗=B
by appealing either to Univalence or to the coincidence of constructive
and mere identity. For the most part, I am just ignoring such problems
for the purposes of this paper. But let me conclude this section with a few
examples of what is at stake. Even if they do not bear on the structuralist
interpretation per se, they may illuminate the picture as a whole.
Example 1. Sets and Propositions. In Chapter III.3 I said that a
proposition was a set with at most one element. There was at least a heuris-
tic basis for this claim. But then, when I got around to formalising things
in §2, I defined the property of being a proposition using the constructive
identity predicate:
(18) isProp(X ) :≡ ∏
(x,x ′):X×X
(x ∗∗= x ′).
Because of this, there will be types X that are not propositions, but of
which
(19) ∀(x, x ′ : X ).(x = x ′)
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is true. This seems to be a way in which ∗∗=, and not =, plays the identity
role. It is something to be explained. But my contention is that we need
not construe x ∗∗= x ′ as a proposition in order to explain it.
I will say a little more along those lines after the next example; but note,
in any case, that the issue does not arise for sets. For sets, constructive and
mere identity coincide. Propositions are sets that satisfy (19). That is why
the issue only bears on the generalisation of set theory.
Example 2: Function Extensionality. Function extensionality is the
principle that if functions are point-wise equal (i.e they take the same val-
ues everywhere) then they are equal simpliciter. How should one formalise
function extensionality in HOTT? If mere equality is equality simplicter,
then function extensionality should be represented by the proposition
(20) ∀( f , g : A→ B). ∀(x : A).( f (x)= g (x))→ ( f = g ).
However, this turns out to contradict Univalence. Rather, Univalence con-
structively implies the constructive analogue of (20):
(21)
∏
( f ,g :A→B)
 ∏
(x:A)
f (x) ∗∗= g (x)
→ ( f ∗∗= g ).
The thrust of the example is that to preserve function extensionality, we
must acknowledge that it is represented by the type (21) rather than (20).
To that extent, at least, constructive equality plays the role of equality sim-
pliciter.
Here is the rough idea of why (20) fails. Naively, if f is a function then
we know
(22) a= b → f (a)= f (b ).
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But in HOTT the constructive version is also constructively true:
(23) a ∗∗= b → f (a) ∗∗= f (b ).
That is, not only does f map merely equal arguments to merely equal val-
ues, it must also determine another whole family of functions that trans-
form constructive equality into constructive equality.9 The values of these
additional functions can vary (with respect to mere equality) even though
the values of f do not. And that is why f is not determined by its values
in the sense of (20).10
Again, it is important to realise that the expected version (20) of func-
tion extensionality holds as long as A and B are sets. When A and B are
sets, (21) and (20) coincide. So no one is denying the usual principle of
function extensionality in the usual cases. Thus the distinction between
(21) and (20), like that between (18) and (19), is a manifestation of the way
in which homotopy type theory generalises set theory. All that is at stake
here is how best to characterise this generalisation.
On the radical view of the previous section, the generalisation consists
in recognising that the logic of identity between elements of non-sets is in-
tuitionistic. In the current discussion, the evidence in favour of this view is
that (23) looks just like the usual principle of functionhood and (21) looks
just like the usual principle of function extensionality. We should accept
that these formulae not only name types but also express these standard
principles as propositions. Similar comments hold for Example 1.
9For types a and b , this means that f is a functor: it maps each isomorphism to another.
10Remarkably, functions can still be defined by λ-abstraction. That is roughly because
λ-abstraction determines both the extension and the intension of the function.
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On the other hand, I say that these types can’t represent the usual prin-
ciples, because they are collections and not propositions. Their ortho-
graphic resemblance to the usual principles doesn’t change that. I say that
the logic of equality is classical; the generalisation of set theory consists in
recognising that there is more to individuation than equality. If ‘individua-
tion’ sounds weasily, I would be happy to say that there is more to equality
than mere equality. That is potentially a great discovery, and I do not wish
to play it down. What I protest against is the thought that this something
more is propositional. For example, perhaps we should gloss (23) by saying
that f ‘translates the whole structure of individuation.’ We can thus try
to escape constructivism, even as a way of speaking.
5. Object Structuralism and Intensional Typing
I have argued that we must consider mere identity, and not construc-
tive identity, to be identity simpliciter. We can now look more closely
at how mere identity in homotopy type theory fits into the structuralist
perspective of this paper.
Here is the basic problem. I explained in §1 that, on the face of it, the
Univalence axiom vindicates object structuralism. (What I said there goes
through perfectly well with mere identity: isomorphic objects are merely
equal.) Given the whole dialectic of this thesis, that vindication should
appear deeply mysterious. The whole point of adopting a dependently
typed language was to avoid equations between sets. And the whole point
of avoiding equations between sets was to vindicate property structural-
ism. Doesn’t reintroducing such equations just reintroduce the problems I
considered in Chapter II? Don’t we know that this can’t work?
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Intensional Typing. The basic answer is that it depends on how the
object-identities interact with the typing system — roughly, on whether
type declarations are extensional contexts. I will say that typing is exten-
sional if the following condition holds: if we have a term ðxñ of type X ,
and a term ðyñ of type Y , and X = Y , then there is a fact of the matter
whether x equals y. If typing is not extensional, I will say it is intensional.
Let me motivate the terminology. At a first pass, when I say ‘there
is a fact of the matter whether x equals y’, I just mean that the equation
ðx = yñ is well-typed. The equation is well-typed just in case x and y have
the same type. But ‘the same’ in what sense? If it suffices that ðX ñ and
ðY ñ corefer, then typing is extensional. But if ðX ñ and ðY ñ must have
the same intension (or even the same syntax), then typing is intensional.
Having said all that, a well-typed equation is only sufficient for there to be
a fact of the matter whether x equals y. It might have been a necessary
condition if the typing system ideally reflected the metaphysics. But, less
ideally, the fact that ðx = yñ is badly typed might just mean that we are
formally unable to express the intended fact, or we might have to express
it by other means. With this problem in mind, here is a slightly broader
sufficient condition for extensional typing. Typing is extensional if any
term of type X is also, or can be converted into, a term of type Y , just on
the basis that X =Y .
Here is why the distinction matters.11 A pointed set is a set A along
with a distinguished element a. The structure-type of pointed sets is thus
PSet :≡∐(X :U )∐x:X > (cf. §2). An isomorphism between pointed sets
is a bijection that maps the distinguished element of the domain to the
11In Chapter II, I considered an example involving spans rather than pointed sets. How-
ever, having escaped from the rigid confines of CST, the following example is both simpler
and more enlightening. Needless to say, the same kind of analysis applies to the earlier
example.
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distinguished element of the codomain. It is then easy to see that pointed
sets (A,a) and (B , b ) are isomorphic if and only if A and B are. Ideally, a
skeletal axiom would lead us to say that the pointed sets (A,a) and (B , b ) are
equal. That is, in fact, the picture that emerges from univalence. But in this
informal discussion, we at least want (A,a) and (B , b ) to be indiscernible.
That means: any predicate F on PSet must take the same value on (A,a) as
on (B , b ). As a specific example, we must have F (X , x)=F (N, 0)whenever
X is countably infinite. But here is an apparent counterexample:
(24) F (X , x) ⇐⇒ X =N and x = 0.
If this definition makes sense, then F (N, 0) is true but F (N, 1) is false. In-
tensional typing denies that the definition makes sense: it denies that there
is a fact of the matter whether x = 0, even given that X =N. This is a bit
different from the strategy I used in ch. II.3. There, in a similar example, I
noted that we can’t formally define F by (24): the equation ðx = 0ñ is badly
typed, since x has variable type X and 0 has constant type N. That sort
of move sufficed when we were only interested in the properties definable
in our first-order language. But once we have moved to the higher-order
setting of MLTT, we can quantify over properties; the question is whether
the admittedly informal definition of F picks out something in the domain
of quantification.
To fend off an obvious objection: no one denies that there is a fact of
the matter whether 0=1 as elements ofN. This might seem enough to dis-
tinguish (X , x) :≡ (N, 1) from (Y, y) :≡ (N, 0). But we have to distinguish
two claims. First, the claim that typing is extensional: if X=Y , then there
is a fact of the matter whether x = y. Second, the weaker claim that if X
and Y are given in the same way then there is a fact of the matter whether
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x= y. Intensional typing contradicts the first, but not the second of these
claims. The view contends that the truth of x = y is settled by fact that
ðX ñ and ðY ñ express the same intension, rather than by the fact that ðX ñ
and ðY ñ corefer. If that’s right, we cannot parlay the distinction between
0 and 1 into a propositional function F on PSet. For example,
(25) X is given to us as N and x = 0
is not a well-defined propositional function of (X , x).
What to make of all this? I characterised intensional typing as denying
that there is a fact of the matter whether x = y, as if their identity were
somehow indeterminate. No doubt I could have put it differently, but I
think this formulation points the right way. Gareth Evans (Evans, 1978;
Lewis, 1988) famously argued that apparently indeterminate identity must
really be due to indeterminate reference. That is exactly the kind of inter-
pretation I will suggest here. More precisely, I suggest how one might re-
late intensional typing to the problem of reference in object structuralism.
5.1. The Indiscernibility of Identicals. Before proceeding to those
questions of interpretation, it may be interesting to see how intensional
typing manifests itself in the formal system of HOTT. The main rule gov-
erning the identity predicate X=Y is the indiscerniblity of identicals. Sup-
pose that P is a predicate onU , i.e. a term of type P :U → Prop. Then
the rule is
(26)
e : X =Y
e∗ : P (X )→ P (Y ).
That is, if X=Y then P (X ) implies P (Y ). Now, naively, this term-forming
rule should hold for an arbitrary function P :U →U , not just when the
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values of P are propositions. To take the most important case, suppose
P (X ) is just X and P (Y ) is just Y . Then the generalised rule would allow
us to construct the identity function e∗ : X → Y . That would contradict
intensional typing: the equation e∗(x)= y would express identity between
x : X and y : Y .12 More generally, if X =Y we must have P (X ) = P (Y );
intensional typing prevents us from constructing ‘the identity function’
P (X )→ P (Y ). Thus, at a formal level, the basic symptom of intensional
typing is that the identity of indiscernibles (26) holds only for propositional
functions.
In contrast, the constructive version of (26) is constructively valid. For
any P :U →U , we have a rule13
(27)
e : X ∗∗=Y
e∗ : P (X )→ P (Y ).
One might say that the cost of giving up the radical view of constructive
identity is that we must give up the full strength of the indiscernibility
of identicals. But one should feel no regret. The rule (27) isn’t really the
indiscernibility of identicals, nor can it restore extensional typing. The
type X ∗∗=Y is relevant, and important, and so on, but it doesn’t express a
proposition. For example, the naive thought is that e∗ is the identity map
between P (X ) and P (Y ). But it can’t be that straightforward: e∗ depends
on e . If we had some other term f : X ∗∗= Y in the offing, it would be
ambiguous which of e∗ and f∗ was supposedly the identity map. It is better
simply not to play the game.
12In particular, we could formalise (24) by
F (X , x) :≡ ∃(e : X =N).e∗(x)= 0.
13This is a special case of a rule called PATH INDUCTION, which is ultimately doing a lot
of the work; but I will not need to invoke it explicitly.
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6. Intensional Typing and Indeterminate Reference
Structural objects, or ante rem structures, are supposed to have ele-
ments or ‘places’ that themselves exemplify the structure in question. So,
for example, the natural numbers structure has countably many places that
are ordered in a certain way. The individual natural numbers are supposed
to be these places; the number five, for example, is one of them. On the
other hand, a structure is supposed to be what isomorphic systems have in
common. In the style of Fregean abstraction:
Structure(X ) = Structure(Y ) ⇐⇒ X ∼= Y.
Then the structure of X is something like the isomorphism class of X . But
isomorphism classes do not have elements; at least, not in the same sense
that systems do. As Burgess (1999, p. 286) put it in his review of Shapiro
(1997), we can define a ‘direction’ to be an equivalence class of lines (where
parallel lines are equivalent); but a direction does not contain points in the
same way lines do. So it is a bit mysterious where these ‘places’ come from.
Nonetheless, we seem to be able to talk about places. Crucially, we
tend to refer to them in a specific way. Given an element of a system, we
can talk about the place occupied (or the role played) by that element in
the structure. That seems to be the basic way we can think about and
refer to places. Again, I am not particularly interested in defending object
structuralism. But if we are willing to entertain this picture, it seems to
shed some light on intensional typing.
How so? Well, suppose I have two models of the complex numbers;
call them X and Y . Suppose that the two square-roots of −1 in X are I
and −I , and those in Y are J and −J . Naively, I can refer to the place
in the complex numbers structure occupied by I ; call this P (I ). I can also
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refer to the place in the complex numbers structure occupied by J ; call this
P (J ). Does P (I ) equal P (J )? Of course, two complex numbers are equal
or they aren’t. And yet there seems to be no fact of the matter whether
the place occupied by I is the same as the place occupied by J . For there
are some isomorphisms between X and Y that send I to J , and others that
send I to −J . It seems certain that P (I ) is either P (J ) or P (−J ) — there
are no other options — but it also seems indeterminate which. A natural
diagnosis is that it is actually indeterminate which place P (I ) is; it refers
indeterminately to one of two possibilities. On the other hand, it must
turn out that P (I ) and P (−I ) are distinct.14 The reference of these terms
is coordinated in a certain way.
In summary, let S(X ) and S(Y ) denote the structures of X and Y . P (I )
and P (−I ) are distinct elements, or places, of S(X ); P (J ) and P (−J ) are
distinct elements, or places, of S(Y ). And although S(X ) equals S(Y ),
there is no fact of the matter whether P (I ) equals P (J ).
The analogy to intensional typing should be clear. My suggestion is to
take it as more than an analogy. I think it is the best hope for explaining
what is going on in HOTT.
Let me explain the view in more detail. The idea is that reference to
structures and their places goes by way of systems. Roughly speaking, a
type symbol like ðAñ has as its sense or intension a system øAù (in the basic
case, øAù is just a set). It has as its referent a structure A. More precisely,
ðAñ refers to A under the guise ‘the structure of øAù’; in the earlier, more
transparent notation, A is S(øAù). Similarly, a term symbol ðañ ‘of type
A’ has as its intension an element of øAù, and as its reference a place in
the structure A. More precisely, ðañ refers to a under the guise ‘the place
14This point in particular has been the subject of much debate; I will briefly consider that
debate in ch. V.2.
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occupied by øaù’. The theory will be about structures like A and their
places in the usual way that a discourse is about the referents of its words.
In particular, equations will express sameness of referents. Still, the inten-
sions of the words play their own role. On the present interpretation, one
particular role they play is in coordinating reference to places.
To vary the example, consider the ‘cardinality-two’ structure which
is exemplified by any two-element set (Shapiro, 2008). Let øAù and øBù
be two such sets, with elements øaù,øa′ù and øbù,øb ′ù respectively. So
øaù,øa′ù occupy the two places of A, as do øbù,øb ′ù. Does øaù occupy the
same place as øbù or the same place as øb ′ù? In other words, does a equal
b ? As before, it seems to me that there is no determinate answer to this
question. That, in short, is my explanation of why ða= bñ is badly typed.
The obvious further diagnosis is that there is no fact of the matter which
place is occupied by øaù. There are some alternative views in this vicinity.
For example, following Breckenridge and Magidor (2012), perhaps there
is a fact of the matter which place is a, but it is determined ‘arbitrarily’,
making it effectively unknowable. On this view, it would be similarly
arbitrary and epistemically indeterminable whether a = b . Here is why
I prefer my view. We know in this situation what it takes to settle the
truth values of identity claims: if we fix an isomorphism ø f ù between øAù
and øBù, then it is natural to say that, with respect to this isomorphism,
øaù occupies the same place as ø f ù(øaù), or that ðañ and ð f (a)ñ corefer. It
wouldn’t make sense to first settle the coreference facts arbitrarily, and then
to further settle them in this way, with respect to an isomorphism. Rather,
without such an isomorphism, the context just doesn’t settle which terms
corefer.
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Admittedly, when I say that it is indeterminate whether a = b , and
when I say there is no fact of the matter whether a = b , and so on, I am
ambivalent about the best way to cash this out. However, I am thinking
about it in the following way, which at least captures all the data. Suppose
that øAù and øBù are isomorphic systems. On my way of thinking, cohab-
itation is a relation between øaù ∈ øAù, øbù ∈ øBù, and an isomorphism
ø f ù : øAù→ øBù. In other words, an equation ða= bñ expressing the fact
that øaù and øbù inhabit the same place only makes sense relative to an
isomorphism ø f ù. We should not expect a well-typed equation ða= bñ,
but we should expect one roughly of the form ða= f bñ. Of course, we do
have a well-typed equation ð f (a)= bñ, and, on my view, this captures the
meaning of ða= f bñ.
Finally, let me explain what I meant when I said that the intensions
of terms coordinate reference to places. Although ða= bñ is badly typed,
ða= a′ñ is not. (I could also write the latter as ða=id a′ñ.) It is determi-
nate whether øaù and øa′ù occupy distinct places in A, or, in other words,
whether a and a′ are distinct places. For that is just a matter of the distinct-
ness of øaù and øa′ù. And this is what I mean when I say that the system
øAù ‘coordinates the reference’ of ðañ and ða′ñ. I might stretch to say,
more generally, that any isomorphism ø f ù : øAù→ øBù coordinates the
reference of terms ðañ and ðbñ; then, as a special case, the identity func-
tion øAù → øAù coordinates the reference of ðañ and ða′ñ. At any rate,
terms of syntactically the same type have their reference coordinated auto-
matically, and terms of syntactically different types are coordinated with
respect to isomorphisms. Remembering that isomorphisms are equivalent
to elements of the constructive identity type A ∗∗=B , this gives a new gloss
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on what constructive identity might be. An element of A ∗∗=B is a way of
coordinating the intensions of ðAñ and ðBñ.
Even if we can introduce enough context (the isomorphism ø f ù) to
settle whether a = b , this does not settle in any absolute sense the refer-
ents of ðañ and ðbñ separately. It only coordinates them. Nothing I have
said or can point to will determine which place of A is occupied by øaù,
assuming that øAù has automorphisms that affect øaù. This is, I think,
how it should be. Shapiro (2012) seems to agree that ordinary determi-
nate reference to places is sometimes impossible. The thought is just that
strong discernibility is necessary for the kind of reference in question. For
example, consider the structure of a committee with two members plus a
chair. Suppose that the two common members have the same powers and
responsibilities, and are selected from a common pool. It would be pretty
strange to ask which member occupied which position in the committee.
There are two places on the committee, and they are occupied by the two
people, but there is simply nothing more to say about which person oc-
cupies which place. In some situations, there may happen to be a natural
bijection between the members of one committee and those of another.
For example, maybe the Committee for Structuralism and the Commit-
tee for Category Theory have the same members. One might stretch to
say that each member has the same place on the first committee as on the
second. But, it seems to me, there is nothing about the structure of each
committee, taken separately, that makes it so.
6.1. Other Structures. I have been talking in general terms about
places in structures. But if ðAñ is a type-symbol, the structure A is just
a cardinality structures, the structures of a set. I want to pause here to
note how things work for more complicated structures. The discussion
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will importantly modify my view that the intension of a type-name is a
particular set.
In section 2, I explained how all the structures of a certain kind can be
gathered into a single ‘structure-type’, like the structure-type of complete
ordered fields, or the structure-type of groups. I’ve discussed the univa-
lence axiom that isomorphic types are equal. I also mentioned that the
skeletal axiom for more complicated structures automatically follows: ele-
ments of a structure type that are isomorphic by the usual model-theoretic
criteria come out equal.
To see why this is surprising, consider again the structure type of point-
ed sets. Again, we know that if øAù and øBù are isomorphic sets, and øaù
and øbù are any elements of øAù and øBù respectively, then the pointed sets
(øAù,øaù) and (øBù,øbù) are isomorphic. We would like to say that the
structures of these pointed sets are therefore equal. How can we express
this equality? Simply by the equation
(28) (A,a)= (B , b ).
At first, this looks strange. Usually, two ordered pairs are equal if and only
if their corresponding components are equal. Certainly, as far as Zermelo
theory is concerned, pointed sets (øAù,øaù) and (øBù,øbù) are equal if and
only if øAù= øBù and øaù= øbù. But we can’t, and mustn’t, analyse (28)
as a conjunction of A= B and a = b . That is exactly the kind of analysis
that intensional typing rules out. What we want to say is that the structure
of (øAù,øaù) equals the structure of (øBù,øbù). It seems most promising
to say that the intension of ð(A,a)ñ is the pointed set (øAù,øbù); its refer-
ent is the structure of this pointed set. The formula (28) expresses equality
between two such structures. A similar story goes for elements of other
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structure-types. (It may seem wrong to think of a structure-type as a col-
lection of structures; shouldn’t it be a structure itself? I will return to this
point in Chapter V.1.)
As a special case, there is, as promised, a unique terminal object 1; any
two types have a unique product; and so on. However, this raises an in-
teresting issue for my story about intensions. The referent of ð1ñ is the
structure of any singleton set; but what is the intension? According to my
basic story, it should be some particular singleton set. Which one? Or,
given types A and B , what is the intension of ðA×Bñ? Presumably it is
a product of øAù and øBù; but which product is it? Perhaps the answer
to each of these questions is ‘Some arbitrary one.’ But a more satisfying
answer would be that 1 is the structure of any and all singleton sets, and
A×B is the structure of any and all products of øAù and øBù.
This answer isn’t meant to be completely general. For example, if a
type A has five elements, I still want to say that A is given to us as the
structure of some particular five-element set, not as the structure of any
and all five-element sets. The motivating idea, again, was that we can refer
to places of A as the places occupied by elements of systems. To get deter-
minate identities between terms of type A, we need the elements to belong
to one and the same system.
In contrast, determinate identity between terms of type 1 or A× B
does not require a particular singleton set or a particular product to be in
the offing. If øX ù and øY ù are singleton sets, with elements øxù and øyù,
it is completely determinate that øxù and øyù occupy the same place in
the structure of any and all singleton sets. There is only one place they
could occupy. There is no need to have one particular set coordinating the
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reference. Similarly, any two products of øAù and øBù are canonically iso-
morphic: there is a uniquely natural way to line up their elements. Thus,
if øxù and øyù are elements of possibly distinct products of øAù and øBù,
it is completely determinate whether they occupy the same place in the
structure A×B of each and every product of øAù and øBù.
Finally, note that A×B is just a cardinality structure like any other. It
comes with functions to A and to B . But these functions are not intrinsic
to A× B itself. They depend on the fact that A× B is given to us in a
certain way; they are determined by the intension of ðA×Bñ. The more
one looks at it, the more work the intensional data has to do. But that
is not surprising. As made clear in ch. III.3, complicated expressions for
types are analogous to sentences of predicate logic. Logic (and most of
life) is only interesting because the true can be expressed in intensionally
complicated ways.
7. Structuralism Without Equality?
I have articulated two views about equality in homotopy type theory.
On the first view, the role of equality (at least, between sets) is played by
non-propositional types A ∗∗= B , and the resulting ‘logic’ of equality is in-
tuitionistic. On the second view, the equality types A= B are genuinely
propositional. But only a weak version of the indiscernibility of identicals
holds, in the sense that typing is intensional.
I have suggested an interpretation of intensional typing; but the reader
might be tempted to conclude that neither A ∗∗= B nor A= B really repre-
sents identity. In this section, I consider the merits of this view. The basic
problem with it is that it leaves open the question of what the types A ∗∗=B
and A= B are actually about. I will argue that we cannot hope for some
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third account of identity and that, as far as HOTT goes, we should accept
mere identity as the best account there is.
7.1. Judgmental Equality? I said just now that there can be no third
account of identity in homotopy type theory. That is not quite right: we
can at least use equality in a definitional sense, as I have done frequently,
without comment, in this thesis. In homotopy type theory, this defini-
tional role is officially played by so called judgmental equality, represented
by the symbol ≡. However, because judgmental equality is part of the
formal system, one might hope that it could play a more than merely def-
initional role. I now argue that such hope is misplaced, although I would
slightly prefer to say that judgmental equality expresses equality of inten-
sion. An equation ðA≡ Bñ does not directly express a relation between A
and B , but only a relation between the intensions of ðAñ and ðBñ. Still, if
that is as far as judgmental equality goes, then we must look elsewhere for
a full-blooded notion of equality.
Let us look more closely at how judgmental equality is typically used.
If one wants to abbreviate an expression s by a new symbol α, then one can
do so by stipulating a judgmental equality ðα≡ sñ. That is an example of
judgmental equality as definitional. However, the use of judgmental equal-
ity is somewhat more general than that. For example, consider how the
rules (7), (8) of pair-formation and projection are related. We expect that,
for any a1 : A1 and a2 : A2, pr1(a1,a2) should equal a1. In the standard treat-
ment of function types, this equality is postulated as a judgmental equality
pr1(a1,a2)≡ a1.
Neither side of the equation is a straightforward abbreviation of the other.
But it would be plausible to claim that the two sides have the same sense.
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Here is the reason that judgmental equality cannot go beyond this sort
of definitional or intensional use. Judgmental equality A≡ B is not a type.
Remember that the logical functors were defined as operations on types.
Thus one cannot apply logical functors to A ≡ B . Because of this, one
cannot formally express the idea that A and B are not judgmentally equal,
or that a type X has five judgmentally distinct elements, or anything like
that. Even if we thought judgmental equality was full-blooded equality
between referents, it would not be able to do the work that equality is
ordinarily supposed to do in mathematics.
Instead of being a type, a judgmental equation ðA≡ Bñ has the same
status as a typing declaration like ða : Añ. Each of these can figure as an
input or an output in a construction. (They are both said to express ‘judg-
ments’, but this traditional terminology seems unhelpful. ) The basic rule
of judgmental equality is that judgmentally equal terms can be substituted
one for another. For example, here is a valid construction using judgmen-
tal equality:
(29)
a : A A≡ B
a : B
A term of type A is equally well of type B . Didn’t this sort of reasoning
lead to problems for the indiscernibility of isomorphs? The formal point
is that, since we cannot apply logical functors to judgmental equalities, we
cannot parlay (29) into a counterexample like (24). We cannot define the
predicate F (X , x) by ‘X ≡ N and. . . ’. This observation corroborates my
view that judgmental equality expresses equality of intension. ‘The morn-
ing star’ and ‘the evening star’ have different intensions, but we cannot
parlay this into a genuine counterexample to the indiscernibility of iden-
ticals.
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7.2. What If Not Equality? We must leave aside judgmental equal-
ity. The view on offer is that neither constructive equality nor its propo-
sitional truncation nor judgmental equality expresses equality of referent.
It is clear this position must be qualified. We cannot discount typical
equality in all cases. We do need identity predicates to do mathematics. We
need to be able to express the fact that two plus two is not equal to five, and
judgmental equality won’t suffice for this: it can’t be negated. However, a
basic observation from categorical set theory was that we don’t ordinarily
need equations between sets. That is why the omission of object-identities
in categorical set theory was pragmatically acceptable. The qualified po-
sition, then, is that we accept as genuine some form of typical equality
between elements of sets, but not between sets themselves. Spelling out
this qualified position is bound to be a little delicate. Within the larger
universeU ′ there will be some objects (the sets) between whose elements
typical equality counts as genuine equality, and other objects (likeU ) for
which some other interpretation is needed.
Still, suppose the line can be drawn between one kind of object and the
other. Such a move would seem to undo the advantages that HOTT has over
categorical set theory as described in Chapter II. In giving up equations be-
tween sets, we would have to give up the skeletal axiom (Univalence would
not be an axiom about identity), and we would fall back into an account
of ‘structural properties’ rather than ‘structural objects’. In particular, we
would not have a conventional ‘unique reference’ account of the use of sin-
gular terms; we would have to fall back on an account like those I described
in ch. III.1.2. Finally, the position leaves open the most interesting ques-
tions about the interpretation of HOTT. How should we interpret typical
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equality in cases where it isn’t genuine equality? How should we interpret
Univalence?
Two slightly different answers suggest themselves. One answer is that
an ‘equation’ between types expresses not equality but indiscernibility. The
other answer is that an ‘equation’ expresses not equality per se but equality
of structure.
Let me look more closely at this second answer before I explain the ba-
sic problem that faces both of them. On this reading, ðAñ and ðBñ refer to
systems A and B , but = expresses sameness of structure rather than iden-
tity of systems. Of course, we are used to the idea that isomorphism means
sameness of structure. So, on this reading, Univalence is something of a
tautology. However, it does have an effect: it transfers to isomorphism
the properties postulated of =. The main such property is the identity
of indiscernibles (or its generalisation in the path induction rule). So the
effect of Univalence is to postulate the indiscernibility of of isomorphs:15
for A,B :U and P :U →U ′,
(30)
f : Iso(A,B)
f∗ : P (A)→ P (B)
Here I have written it in its general constructive form. Even if we elimi-
nate cosntructive and mere equality, we must still attend to the distinction
between (as it were) constructive and mere isomorphism.
Now, we already had in Chapter II a theorem about the indiscernibility
of isomorphs in categorical set theory. What is new here? The earlier
theorem was really a metatheorem about what kinds of properties one
could define in the first-order theory of categories. The work being done
15A similar point is made more formally by Pelayo and Warren (2012, pp. 40–41).
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by Univalence is to express indiscernibility of the isomorphs within the
formal system. To see what this means, consider what would happen if we
tried to add a new, ‘genuine’ identity predicate to the theory. We would
want, for each pair of sets A and B , a proposition I (A,B). Presumably, we
want I (A,A) to be true for each type A. But (30) would then yield that A∼=
B implies I (A,B).16 In short, genuine identity is entailed by isomorphism.
So even if we deny that HOTT as it stands has identity predicates for types,
any attempt to introduce such predicates leads inevitably back to the motto
that ‘isomorphic objects are equal’. In contrast, categorical set theory is
compatible with the introduction of a genuine identity predicate that is
not entailed by isomorphism — the usual identity predicate of Zermelo
set theory.
But wait, there’s more. The argument so far shows that A ∼= B im-
plies I (A,B). By Univalence, we could equally well say that A=B implies
I (A,B). If genuine identity I satisfies at least the weak version of the indis-
cernibility of identicals, then we will also find the converse: I (A,B) implies
A=B . So genuine identity is logically equivalent to whatever is expressed
by =. In fact, it then follows17 that
genuine identity is genuinely identical to =.
This argument works whether we try to interpret = as indiscernibility
or as sameness of structure, or as something else. It is a version of the
16Explicitly: define P (X ) :≡ I (A,X ). Then (30) yields I (A,A)→ I (A,B). Since I (A,A) is
true, we can conclude that I (A,B) is true.
17In detail: for arbitrary A,B : U , we have I (A,B)↔ A ∼= B . Since both I (A,B) and
A∼= B are propositions, the two functions involved in this biconditional must be inverse
isomorphisms. Since isomorphism implies genuine identity, I (A,B) is genuinely identical
to A∼= B . (The reader may then use Function Extensionality (21) to deduce that I and =
are genuinely identical as functions.)
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familiar argument that, given the resources of second-order logic, we can
define identity in terms of indiscernibility.
In conclusion, it is logically possible to deny that = expresses genuine
equality. But if we do so, we must accept that there can be no other genuine
equality predicate in HOTT. Such a position is not without precedent. In
Resnik’s view (Resnik, 1997, p. 210), ‘patterns’ are subject only to ‘con-
gruence’ and not identity. In an older precedent, Frege denied that identity
applies to concepts.18 Both of these views deny that the entities in question
are truly objects. It would be interesting to investigate these views more
closely in the current context. But, on the face of it, the conceptual price of
giving up equality seems greater to me than the price of simply accepting
that it is expressed by mere identity. The price of the latter is intensional
typing; I have tried to explain how it might be paid.
8. Conclusion
The Univalence Axiom amounts to a quite general skeletal axiom; it
provides hope for homotopy type theory as an object-structuralist founda-
tion. But the theory is also haunted by the spectre of intuitionistic logic. I
explored how one might give a sympathetic interpretation of HOTT while
preserving the idea that identity is a genuine relation, satisfying classical
logic. For this narrow purpose, the main issue is intensional typing; I sug-
gested how it might be explained in terms of a referential indeterminacy
that naturally arises from object structuralism. In this context, the notion
of constructive identity can be eliminated in favour of isomorphism. But
I left wide open its general interpretation.
18Cf. Furth’s introduction to (Frege, 1893), p. xliv.
CHAPTER V
Challenges
In this chapter I raise some issues that will have to be addressed in a
fuller development of the ideas in this thesis.
1. Inter-Structure Identity
So far, I have generally taken the view that a structure is specified by
an object in a category. Perhaps this doesn’t always work; it is probably
not true that an arbitrary object in an arbitrary category has a structure in
any useful sense. But if we look at the category of the models of some the-
ory — the category of sets, or pointed sets, or groups — then it is pretty
natural to say that each object has a certain structure, and that isomor-
phic objects have the same structure, and that non-isomorphic objects do
not. Univalence builds on this picture. We have a structure-type PSet of
pointed sets (for example), in which the objects are individuated exactly by
isomorphism. Similarly, we have a structure-type of groups, and of course
a structure-typeU of sets (see ch. III.1.) Univalence works well in all these
cases.
However, there are a number of puzzles about this picture which ought
to be addressed if we are to have a full account of HOTT as a theory of
structure. I will introduce some of them now, although a full investigation
will have to wait for another occasion. The basic question to be answered
is: when does object A of structure-type C have the same structure as
object B of structure-type D? At first glance, Univalence goes a long way
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towards providing an answer. I will explain why things are not so simple,
and then speculate about what the general picture might be.
First, why might Univalence help? To give a simple but not quite triv-














of two-pointed sets whose two points are equal; call the latter shmointed
sets. It is very tempting to think that pointed set structures and shmointed
set structures are the same thing. In particular, it is very tempting to think
that the pointed set (X , x) has the same structure as the shmointed set
(X , x, x). Univalence appears to respect this intuition. At least, the func-
tion (X , x) 7→ (X , x, x) from pointed set structures to schmointed set struc-
tures is an isomorphism. If Univalence applies, then PSet equals PSet′.
Pointed set structures are shmointed set structures!
However, unfettered, this kind of reasoning is catastrophic. Here is a
dramatic example. Consider the structure typeN of models of the second-
order Peano axioms. Consider also the structure type R of complete or-
dered fields. Now, up to unique isomorphism, there is only one model
of the second-order Peano axioms, and only one complete ordered field
(the real numbers). This means thatN andR are both one-element sets.
If Univalence applies, N equals R . Natural numbers structures are real
numbers structures! This is, of course, absurd.
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It might appear that we have to block this second example at all costs.
Let me explain why one obvious way to do this is unattactive. We could
deny Univalence for U ′. I am taking it for granted that the universe U
satisfies Univalence, but we are not necessarily committed to Univalence
for the larger universeU ′. If we denied it, then we could not inferN =R .
More generally, we would not be committed to the view that elements of
U ′ are cardinality structures. However, this move is unsatisfactory. First,
it leaves open what the correct account of identity in U ′ is. Second, the
original motivation for having a hierarchy of universes was that U ′ con-
tains sets (or structures) that are ‘too big’ to fit inU . But if the difference
betweenU andU ′ is simply one of size, then the motivation for assuming
Univalence forU applies just as well in the case ofU ′.
In fact, I do not think that we have to block the example. Here is
a diagnosis of what is going wrong. In some contexts, ‘N ’ denotes a
collection extensionally defined: the collection of natural-numbers struc-
tures. In other contexts — when we speak of N as an element of U ′ —
it denotes a structure: the structure of the collection of natural numbers
structures. The latter is the context in whichN =R , this being an equa-
tion between elements of U ′. The equation says (a bit roughly) that the
number of natural-numbers structures equals the number of real-numbers
structures. That is as it should be, but we obviously cannot deduce that
natural-numbers structures are real-numbers structures.
Strictly speaking, the same disambiguation must apply to the symbol
‘U ’. Sometimes ‘U ’ denotes an extensionally given collection: the collec-
tion — rename it S — of all small cardinality structures. In this context,
a term A of typeU denotes one of those structures, and a term of type A
denotes a place in that structure. But when we speak ofU as an element
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of a larger universe U ′, ‘U ’ denotes the structure of S . In this second
picture, a term A of type U denotes the place in that structure occupied
by a certain small cardinality structure. This equivocation about the deno-
tation of terms of typeU does not lead to formal contradiction precisely
because small cardinality structures are individuated in the same way as
the places they occupy.
This kind of disambiguation prevents the catastrophic conclusion that
real-numbers structurs are natural-numbers structures. But it also shows
that we cannot deduce anything useful about the relationship between
pointed set structures and shmointed set structures just from the equation
PSet=PSet′. Thus the question with which I started remains untouched:
when are two structure-types the same (as structure-types, rather than as
cardinality structures) and when are elements of different structure-types
the same as structures?
If we really are thinking of structure-types extensionally as collections
of structures, then I suspect that homotopy type theory has little to say
on its own about this question. The reason for scepticism is that we are
asking whether two structure-types are extensionally the same – whether
they contain the same structures — whereas Univalence is about whether
they are (in one sense or another) structurally the same.
That isn’t meant to be a knock-down objection. In the first case, I
pointed out in ch. II.4.1 that the extension of a Zermelo set can be concep-
tualised structurally. More generally, there is an idea extant in the struc-
turalist literature that (for example) to be a collection of structures of a cer-
tain kind isn’t an extensional property at all; it just is to have a structure
of a certain kind. I will call this idea meta-structuralism. To give a simple
1. INTER-STRUCTURE IDENTITY 110
example, each structure-type T comes with a ‘first projection’ function
pr1 : T → U , mapping the structure of a system to the structure of the
underlying set. Although N and R are isomorphic, there is no isomor-
phism between them that commutes with the first projections. To put it
another way, HOTT distinguishes the structure of (N , pr1) from the struc-
ture of (R , pr1). This may be just what we need to distinguish natural
numbers structures from real numbers structures.
This kind of meta-structuralist view may be latent in Awodey’s ‘top-
down’ structuralism (Awodey, 2004), but its clearest formal development
may be the theory of the Category of Categories as a foundation (CCAF).
This theory was seen even by Lawvere (1964) as more promising a founda-
tion than categorical set theory. For some philosophical discussion of it,
see (Hellman, 2006; Linnebo and Pettigrew, 2011). The meta-structuralist
idea deserves more attention than I can give it here. In particular, it would
be interesting to understand whether there is a formalism that stands in
the same relation to CCAF that HOTT stands in to categorical set theory.
Let me conclude this tentative discussion by considering an example
that illustrates the present concerns and raises a number of problems for
further investigation. Let oS et be the structure-type of ordered sets. Con-
sider its elements (N,≥) and (N,≤). Do they have the same structure? On
the one hand, it is hard to escape the feeling that the difference between≥
and ≤ is purely orthographic — a matter of the order in which one writes
the arguments — and in no way a matter of metaphysics. For some very
natural sense of the word ‘structure’, these systems undoubtedly have the
same structure. On the other hand, as long as we are talking about mathe-
matical structuralism, we should attend to the ways in which mathematics
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individuates structures. The fact remains that (N,≥) and (N,≤) are non-
isomorphic as ordered sets,1 and that must point to a legitimate sense in
which their structures are distinct. It is noteworthy that (N,≥) and (N,≤)
are ‘definitionally equivalent’ by the usual criteria (Hodges, 1997, p.54).
So the example tells against the very common thought that definitionally
equivalent systems, in general, have the same structure (e.g. Shapiro (1997,
p. 91), following Resnik (1981), and Halvorson (2012)).
What light might meta-structuralism shed on this example? According
to meta-structuralism, oS et (along with some relevant data) is an ante rem
structure and (N,≥) and (N,≤) are places in this structure. This is anal-
ogous to the way in which ‘the complex numbers’ is supposed to be an
ante-rem structure, and i and −i are places in that structure. There is the
well-known puzzle about what distinguishes i from−i (of which more in
section 2). Although it is certain that i and−i are distinct, there is no fur-
ther fact about which square root of −1 is i and which is −i ; one can only
say that i is i and −i is −i . In IV.6 I put this down to indeterminacy of
reference. If I was right, the relationship between (N,≥) and (N,≤) may
be of fundamentally the same sort. Although ‘(N,≥)’ and ‘(N,≤)’ refer to
determinately distinct structures, it is indeterminate which one refers to
which.
Finally, let me point out a basic problem that this example raises for the
structuralist credentials of homotopy type theory. I insisted that (N,≥)
and (N,≤) have different structures, because they are not isomorphic as
ordered sets. This stance does not require us to abandon the idea that (N,≥
) and (N,≤) have the same structure in some sense of the word. And we can
even explicate that sense by introducing a category in which these systems
1They are non-isomorphic, because, for example, ∃(x :N).∀(y :N).(yRx) is true when R
is ≥ and false when R is ≤.
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are isomorphic. For example, we could re-define a morphism between
ordered sets (X , R) and (X ′, R′) to be a function f : X → X ′ that is either
order-preserving or order-reversing:
∀(x, y : X ).(xRy→ f (x)R′ f (y))
∨∀(x, y : X ).(xRy→ f (y)R′ f (x)).
(31)
But this only shows that the notion of isomorphism is flexible enough to
accommodate many different notions of structure. It does not show that
the notion of structure implicit in (31) is the ‘right’ notion, and, if any-
thing, mathematical practice points the other way. Here is the problem
for the structuralist interpretation of homotopy type theory: although
(N,≥) and (N,≤) are isomorphic in the sense of (31), one can’t use Univa-
lence to deduce that they are equal. That’s because Univalence coordinates
equality with the standard notion of isomorphism between ordered sets.2
This is a serious qualification to Awodey’s claim that ‘two mathematical
objects are identical if and only if they have the same structure’ (Awodey,
2014). I discuss an even more important example in the next section.
2. Homotopy and Identity
A crucial feature of homotopy type theory that I have largely brack-
eted until now is the way it generalises set-theoretic mathematics. I have
explained how it does this formally: there are cases in which propositional
equality does not coincide with mere equality, and this has an impact (for
example) on how functions are individuated (ch. IV.4). A fuller evaluation
2In the terminology of the ‘Structure Identity Principle’ of (UFP, ch. 9), (31) does not
define a ‘standard notion of structure’. The method of Rezk completion (UFP, ch 9) may
allow us to overcome this problem, but, anyway, the point is that Univalence does not
do it on its own.
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of HOTT than I can provide here would attend more carefully to this gener-
alisation. In this section, I make some preliminary comments about how
this generalisation might intersect with the structuralist interpretation.
It may be useful to begin by recalling an old debate. One of the main
preoccupations of the literature on ante rem structuralism has been the
sense, if any, in which the places of an ante rem structure are individuated
by or grounded in or otherwise metaphysically dependent upon the struc-
ture. Here is a stripped-down version of the issue. On the one hand, the
complex numbers i and −i are distinct; but, on the other, they seem to
play the same role in the structure of the complex numbers, since they are
related by an automorphism. Therefore the way complex numbers are in-
dividuated is different from the way in which places in the structure are
individuated. Therefore the complex numbers can’t be the places in that
structure. This contradicts ante rem structuralism.
The obvious response is that the places i and−i are ‘the same’ in being
indiscernible, not in being equal. But then one might wonder what it is
that makes them distinct. Ladyman (2005) tried to explain it in terms of
‘weak discernibility’, but further discussion (Ketland, 2006; Leitgeb and
Ladyman, 2008; Shapiro, 2008) has shown this is not enough. Something
like a consensus has developed that, indeed, ante rem structuralists must
accept the distinctness of the places as a primitive feature of the structure.3
This is, too, is the bottom line in the structuralist interpretation of ho-
motopy type theory. The theory has nothing to say about what makes
elements of the same object distinct.
3Whether or not this is a problem is more controversial: see MacBride (2005) and Shapiro’s
exchange with Keränen in (MacBride, 2006).
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However, I think one can say a little more than this, from the point of
view that ‘structure is what is preserved by isomorphism’. Any isomor-
phism between sets — or between groups, or pointed sets, or complete
ordered fields — is a bijection; it particular, it preserves the distinctness of
the elements. That distinctness is, therefore, part of the structure. Identity
is certainly special in that it is not schematic in the way other parts of the
structure are. In different exemplifications of the natural numbers struc-
ture, the ‘greater than’ role is filled by different relations: in one model, it
might be ‘greener than’, and, in another, ‘closer to Betelgeuse than’. Iden-
tity is always identity; but it is part of the structure nonetheless.
Non-Structural Distinctness. This observation that isomorphisms
preserve the distinctness of elements may seem vacuous. But, far from be-
ing vacuous, it is not always true. I will sketch two of the central examples.
The first example is that of homotopy structure. In the basic version
of the story, the things that exemplify homotopy structure are topologi-
cal spaces. Roughly speaking, two spaces exemplify the same homotopy
structure if they can be deformed into each other by arbitrary continuous
stretching and shrinking. As basic examples, a solid ball has the same ho-
motopy structure as a disk, a line, or a single point. A two-handled mug has
a different homotopy structure from those, but the same homotopy struc-
ture as the figure ‘8’. A hollow sphere has yet another homotopy structure.
The notion of ‘isomorphism’ that corresponds to this notion of structure
is called homotopy equivalence. It differs from the standard notion of ‘iso-
morphism between topological spaces’, namely, homeomorphism. The
exact definition isn’t important for the limited discussion I have space for
here. What should already be evident is that homotopy equivalences need
not be bijections; they need not preserve the distinctness of points. For
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example, a solid ball is homotopy-equivalent to a single point, but the ball
and the point have different cardinalities. In this particular case, any func-
tion between them will determine a homotopy equivalence.4
A second example is given by category theory. For simplicity, think
about the standard two-sorted theory of categories (ch. II.1). This theory
is stated in a standard first-order language, and there is a standard notion
of isomorphism between models of such a theory. However, it is generally
recognised that the structure that category theory is typically intended to
capture is reflected in a more general kind of ‘isomorphism’, namely the
so-called equivalences of categories. These equivalences need not preserve
the distinctness of objects. Again, equivalent categories may even have
different cardinalities of objects. This observation provides another way
of getting at the issues raised in Chapter II. Equations between objects
in a category are suspect precisely because they are not invariant under
equivalence. They do not reflect anything intrinsic to the structure of the
category.
These examples raise serious questions about the cogency of ante rem
structuralism. Do category structures have places? Do homotopy struc-
tures? If the homotopy structure of a ball has places, how many does it
have? Uncountably many, like the ball, or just one, like the point? To put
it optimistically: if these structures have places, then there is something
novel about the way in which those places are individuated.
The Homotopy Interpretation. I have several times mentioned that
one motivation for homotopy type theory is the desire for a synthetic
4The reader may wonder how it is that an isomorphism can fail to be a bijection, since an
isomorphism must be invertible, and, among functions, only bijections are invertible. A
proper answer to this question would lead us deep into the heart of the matter. For now,
the short answer is that a morphism in the relevant category is not a function at all, but
an equivalence class of functions. It is still true that any function between the ball and
the point determines a homotopy equivalence.
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treatment of homotopy theory, distinct from its usual development in set
theory. The exact motivation is bound to be complicated, but we can now
grasp something about it. Each set-theoretic exemplification of a homo-
topy structure has properties that are not part of the structure. For ex-
ample, each model has some particular cardinality. Of course, if we are
talking about models in Zermelo set theory, then Benacerraf’s observation
automatically applies: the extension of the model is not part of the struc-
ture. But the new problem is a problem even if we look for models among
the sets of categorical set theory or indeed those of homotopy type the-
ory. In these theories, we cannot distinguish equinumerous sets by their
extensions, but we can still distinguish sets that aren’t equinumerous. Uni-
valence does not entail that isomorphic models of homotopy structure are
equal, if these models are constructed by the usual set-theoretic methods.5
It is for roughly this reason that set theory can’t yield a fully perspicacious
explication of homotopy structure. Homotopy type theory, in generalis-
ing set theory, seeks a better way forward.6
The position, then, is this. Examples like homotopy theory and cat-
egory theory raise serious problems for ante rem structuralism. But the
same kind of problems lie behind HOTT’s attempt to generalise set theory.
If the set-theoretic part of HOTT does, indeed, articulate a structuralist vi-
sion of mathematics, then perhaps HOTT as a whole will be faithful guide
to what structuralists can and should say about these more difficult exam-
ples. There is, of course, the obverse risk: perhaps an investigation of the
5At the end of the previous section I gave a simpler example in which Univalence fails to
entail that ‘isomorphic systems are equal’. That example is worth further analysis, but it
is not as central to contemporary mathematics as homotopy theory and category theory
are.
6I made a few further remarks about the homotopy interpretation in IV.4.
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I began this thesis with a very conservative view of structuralist foun-
dations. ‘To get the ball rolling,’ I wrote, ‘I am happy to grant that Zermelo
set theory is true and epistemically secure.’ Let us see where that ball has
rolled.
On the conservative view, the two-sorted version of categorical set the-
ory is a property-structuralist theory of sets. Its objects are Zermelo sets,
but it focuses only on their structural properties — at least as far as monadic
predicates go. As soon as we consider more complicated predicates, or,
what amounts to the same thing, monadic predicates of more complicated
systems, it ceases to be a property-structuralist theory. The language can
express non-structural properties of spans, of pointed sets, and on and on.
There is room for a more progressive view, according to which the sets
of CST are not Zermelo sets, but something sui generis, either abstracted
from Zermelo sets or corresponding to some entirely new conception.
These sui generis sets would have only structural properties; we would
have an object-structuralist set theory. But the same problem would arise:
we would not have a structuralist foundation for mathematics in general.
Either way, the problem can be ‘fixed’ by eschewing set-identity pred-
icates. This required adopting strict type distinctions into the language.
It is hard to understand this as more than a linguistic gambit, a means
for ignoring non-structural properties. So while categorical set theory has
118
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some merit as a property-structuralist foundation for mathematics in gen-
eral, it does not seem promising as an articulation of object structuralism.
As a property-structuralist foundation, its objects might be systems con-
structed either from Zermelo sets (on the conservative reading) or from
sui generis categorical sets (on the progressive one).
Homotopy type theory, in contrast, while building conceptually on
categorical set theory, looks like a candidate for an object-structuralist
foundation. The Univalence axiom ensures that isomorphic systems are
identical. It is worth pointing out, again, that this implication of Uni-
valence is not completely general. But, as far as it goes, I suggested an
object-structuralist gloss on Univalence: ante rem structures with isomor-
phic systems of places are identical. However, to connect back to all the
problems raised in Chapter II, this theory of ante rem structures is not
completely autonomous. At least, we need an explanation of intensional
typing; the one I gave appealed to the idea that structures are given to us
as the structures of systems. These systems might, again, be constructed
from Zermelo sets or from sui generis categorical sets. Given the way in
which homotopy type theory builds on categorical set theory, the latter
option seems particularly attractive; but I am afraid I cannot say much
about it either way. We could even look further afield; the systems could
include systems of concreta, or, for all I’ve said, ‘free creations of the hu-
man mind.’ Some systems are needed, though — or we need another ac-
count of intensional typing.
In short, there are a range of possibilities within the structuralist genre.
More work will be required to see how well they hang together. What I
have had time and space for in this thesis can only be the beginning of the
conversation. Much more attention should be paid, in particular, to the
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ways in which HOTT seeks to generalise set-theoretical mathematics. This
generalisation should be philosophically interesting in its own right, if it
provides a perspicacious treatment of homotopy theory and its kin. But it
is also bound to modify, enlighten, or destroy the kind of possibilities that
I have offered here.
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